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Legal Ethics
by Jack L. Sammons*
The dominant event during this surveyed period' is not an event at
all. It is instead a struggle so pervasive that its lurking presence is felt
behind every important case and Formal Advisory Opinion ("FAO")
decided this year. This struggle is between the two primary functions
that the Georgia appellate courts perform in this area of law: the
normal judicial function and the regulation of the legal profession.2
This second function is a legislative and an interpretative one. Appellate
courts in Georgia perform the interpretive fimction in both an advisory
capacity through FAO's and in a judicial capacity through case law in
which the courts profess to be relying upon rules, ethical regulations,
and other fitorms applicable only to lawyers.
I have described this dominant event as a "struggle" because these two
functions create what one author has described as competing hierarchies.' The governing norms of the profession are usually shared,
Koniak tells us, by which she means that there is little quarrel between
the functions over who and what governs lawyers.4 But each function
orders these shared norms very differently. For example in the
regulatory function, appellate courts place the ethical standards of the
profession very high in the hierarchy of governing norms, while in the
* Professor of Law, Mercer University. Special thanks to Ms. Renate Downs, a third
year law student at Mercer, for excellent research assistance under the most adverse of
circumstances and thanks to Ms. Carmen Rojas, also a third year student, for her fine
assistance as well. Ms. Tedham Porterhouse, as usual, provided much needed inspiration.
1. The surveyed period is June 1, 1993 to May 31, 1994. To avoid the awkward phrase,
surveyed period, I will refer to this period as "this year."
2. Within the judicial function, the courts tell us how laws of general applicability apply
to our profession, for example, whether conduct of an attorney is criminal. This is, in
some sense, a regulatory function as well, but it is one the courts perform for all in their
ordinary capacity.
3.

Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389,

1393-95 (1992). Note that for her purposes she is describing the communities in which
these competing hierarchies are located as the state and the bar.
4. Koniak, supra note 3, at 1394.
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judicial function these same standards are typically placed very low.'
Usually, these functions overlap and when they do, and when the courts
recognize the overlap, each function demands that its particular ordering
be honored. So a struggle ensues.
Even more dramatically, in some contexts this struggle is not just over
the ordering of shared governing norms, but also over whether the
governing norms of the other function are applicable at all. We can find
good examples this year in case law involving the interpretation of
contracts for legal fees, what roles our ethical standards are to perform
in malpractice cases,' and in one recent FAO concerning fee waivers by
appointed criminal defense lawyers in plea bargaining.' In each of
these opinions, either the judicial function or the regulatory function
seeks to deny the relevance of the governing norms of the other function.
Sometimes the governing norms are not in question and their ordering
is not practically important because the norms each function would
apply to the case produce the same results. We can see several
examples of this as well this year, including one potentially important
case determining whether penalty clauses for terminating an employment contract with an attorney are permissible." Even in these "more
harmonious" contexts, however, appellate judges argue over which
function is to be credited for the decision.
There is nothing new about this struggle, as courts that have fought
in the long ethical battle with the SEC over disclosure requirements will
confirm,'" and the recent emergence of its lurking presence from the
shadows into the penumbra, if not the light, is certainly not a local
phenomenon. For example, the nation had this struggle thrust upon it
recently in decisions considering IRS fee-reporting requirements,"

5. When the norms of the regulatory function do appear in the legal function, their
hierarchy within the former is often ignored completely. For example, it is not at all
unusual to see Georgia courts referring to the Ethical Considerations of the Georgia Code
of Professional Responsibility (the aspirational statements of a Code that was adopted in
Georgia for guidance only) and the Standards of Conduct (our disciplinary rules) as if they
were of equal ranking. Ignoring the hierarchy of the other function is one way of
dismissing its importance.
6. See Donohue v. Green, 209 Ga. App. 381, 433 S.E.2d 431 (1993).
7. See Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C., 212 Ga. App. 560,442 S.E.2d
466 (1994).
8. Formal Advisory Opinion Board of the State Bar of Georgia, Formal Op. 93-3 (1993)
[hereinafter Formal Op.].
9. AFLAC, Inc. v. Williams, 264 Ga. 351, 444 S.E.2d 314 (1994).
10. See, e.g., SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
11. In many jurisdictions this legal requirement has conflicted with the bar's efforts to
prohibit reporting as an ethical matter. The most recent case on this issue is United States
v. Sindel, 854 F. Supp. 595 (E.D. Mo. 1994). For a recent general analysis see, Tax Focus,
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attempts to place ethical restrictions on the issuance of subpoenas

against attorneys,12 the enforcement of ethical regulatory limits on
prosecutorial communications with represented defendants," and,
somewhat earlier, in two United States Supreme Court cases approving
the simultaneous negotiation of attorney fees in civil rights cases14 and
"release/dismissal" plea bargaining. ' But the extent of this struggle
in Georgia, something that may be driven by the Georgia Supreme
Court's nationally recogn'zed professionalism efforts and the court's role
in issuing FAO's, is certainly noteworthy.
Even a casual reader of opinions could see that the Georgia appellate
courts caught in this struggle are confused. As old methods of avoiding
the struggle fail,' the courts seem to slip from one hierarchy to the
other and back again, often without readily discernable reason. Such
confusion is not only understandable, but should be expected given the
struggle's depth and complexity. For as appellate courts attempt to
work out the relationship between their two functions with their
competing hierarchies, they necessarily raise foundational questions
about both functions.
Of course foundational questions are questions that most courts seek
to avoid. For this reason, and for others, the struggle I am referring to
is seldom noted explicitly or discussed straightforwardly by any Georgia
court. Nevertheless, its lurking presence is now so obvious and growing

81 Standard Federal Tax Reports, (CCH) No. 34, Part 2 (Aug. 11, 1994).
12. One recent event in this contest between legal requirements and ethical regulation
is Almond v. United States District Court for the Dist. of Rhode Island, 852 F. Supp. 78
(D.N.H. 1994). See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
94-385 (1994). For an earlier analysis of this issue and the issue of anti-contact rules, see
Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The
Controversies Over The Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 291 (1992).
13. See United States v. Marcus, 849 F.Supp. 417 (D.Md. 1994). See also Cramton &
Udell, supra note 12, at 295. The Attorney General of the United States Janet Reno
recently addressed this issue with regard to government lawyers and established that
prosecuting attorneys can communicate with represented persons before they become
parties, e.g. prior to the initiation of court actions. Thereafter, such communication is
prohibited. Communications With Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39910 (1994) (to be
codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 77).
14. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
15. See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987).
16. For example, in the regulatory function performed through FAO's, the attempt to
avoid the legal function entirely, and thereby avoid the struggle, by eschewing any
interpretation of law is becoming more and more difficult and less and less believable. See
infra notes 264-76 and accompanying text. In the judicial function, the attempt to shut off
any discussion of regulatory norms with claims of irrelevancy or the like is also becoming
more difficult and less believable. See infra notes 105-29 and accompanying text; see also
infra notes 221-63 and accompanying text.
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so rapidly that I believe it will be the primary force shaping both ethics
case law and FAO's over the next decade. If this is true, then I hope the
reader will agree with me that I would be remiss in my descriptive task
if I did not note this struggle well. I have tried to do so by making it the
theme of this survey.
I.

OVERVIEW

Other than by connection with our theme, many cases and FAO's
issued this year are of limited interest because they only apply in limited
contexts. But not all are. In the area of legal fees, along with Donohue
u. Green, 7 a routine case of contract interpretation finding that the
phrase "[a percentage] of whatever amount may be recovered... plus all
advances and expenses" in a contract for representation is too ambiguous
on the issue of whether "advances and expenses" are due if nothing is
recovered, we find AFLAC, Inc. v. Williams,"8 a potentially important
case prohibiting contractual penalties for terminating employment
contracts with attorneys. The potential importance of this opinion is
that it raises serious questions about the increasingly common practice
of contracting for nonrefundable fees.
In the legal malpractice area, we see the supreme court poised to
reconsider the role of ethical regulatory standards in determining
misconduct. This important development should come soon in two
certified appeals, one taken from the recent court of appeals decision in
Allen v. Lef off, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer,PC.,'9 and the other from
Tante v. Herring.' This year, the court of appeals also offered two
more cases in an increasingly long line of opinions determining when a
client-lawyer relationship sufficient to support a malpractice claim arises
in real estate closings. In this very troubling area, the cases of Richard
v. David2 ' and Williams v. Fortson, Bentley & Griffin22 disappoint by
doing little other than reaffirming the odd importance of "the seeking or

17. 209 Ga. App. 381, 433 S.E.2d 431, 432 (1993).
18. 264 Ga. 351, 444 S.E.2d 314, 315 (1994).
19. 212 Ga. App. 560, 442 S.E.2d 466 (1994).
20. 211 Ga. App. 322,439 S.E.2d 5 (1993). While this Article was in final editing, the
supreme court decided the certified appeal in Tante v. Herring. See Tante v. Herring, 1994
Ga. LEXIS 866 (Oct. 31, 1994). Fortunately for the Article, the decision rendered, while
it introduces new complexities and postpones what I see as an emerging conflict between
the judicial and regulatory functions of the court, does not significantly change the basic
analysis of Tante and its implications as discussed in the text. Accordingly, I have left the
textual discussion of Tante unedited. I review the supreme court's decision, noting the
difference it does make, at infra note 184.
21. 212 Ga. App. 661, 442 S.E.2d 459 (1994).
22. 212 Ga. App. 222, 441 S.E.2d 686 (1994).
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the giving of advice" as a criteria for determining the existence of the
relationship and by reaffirming Georgia's overly rigid enforcement of
disclaimers of representation.
In what I have dubbed the "badpractice" area (as opposed to malpractice because the direct harm is not to the client), we find FAO 93-3, 2'
rightfully denouncing the tactic of a prosecutor asking for waivers of
appointed fees as part of the plea bargain in a death penalty case, but
raising troubling questions about the effect of FAO's in the process.24
We also find Justice Benham of the supreme court attacking one
lawyer's unfair use of notice service in Green u. Green' and using
"professionalism" norms from within the regulatory function to do so;
something that prompted Justice Sears-Collins to write a concurring
opinion pointing out the dangers involved.2"
Readers get a reprieve from the notorious and well-populated area of
conflict of interests this year because we had no cases of great significance. The appellate courts did face several allegations of conflicts in
ineffective assistance of counsel cases including Redd u. State2" and
Pittman v. State,'8 both of which considered the effectiveness of
defendants' waivers, and Zant v. Hill,29 an opinion refusing, in at least
some circumstances, to apply the automatic requirement of separate
counsel for death penalty co-defendants to defendants with separate
charges arising out of the same incident. 3' There were also two appeals
1 disqualifying a
from disqualification motions: Chapel v. State,"
criminal defense lawyer for his current and former representation of the
county, 2 and Billings v. State,' refusing to disqualify a District
Attorney's office for an Assistant DA's prior representation of the codefendant of a defendant currently prosecuted by the office. 4 Other
than Zant, these conflict cases add little substance. Chapel and Billings
are both problematic, but they are so because they perpetuate the wellreviewed problems of previous conflict of interests opinions. Accordingly,
I have not reviewed these opinions here.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Formal Op. 93-3 (1993).
Id.
263 Ga. 551, 437 S.E.2d 457 (1993).
263 Ga. 551-55, 437 S.E.2d 457, 460 (1993) (Sears-Collins, J., concurring).
264 Ga. 399, 444 S.E.2d 776 (1994).
208 Ga. App. 211, 430 S.E.2d 141 (1993).
262 Ga. 815, 425 S.E.2d 858 (1993).
Id. at 816, 425 S.E.2d at 860.
264 Ga. 267, 270, 443 S.E.2d 271, 274 (1994).
Id. at 269, 443 S.E.2d at 273.
212 Ga. App. 125, 129, 441 S.E.2d 262, 266 (1994).
Id. at 129, 441 S.E.2d at 266.
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There were only three FAO's issued during the year as the supreme
court' and the FAO Board of the Georgia Bar continued to inch along
at a snail's pace. Besides FAO 93-3 on plea bargaining, the Board issued
one apparently partial opinion that attempts to head off conflicts when
a lawyer is in the familiar, but awkward, role of representing the
insured and the insurer on a subrogation claim." In the final FAOone that was seven years in the making-the supreme court tells us that
a criminal defense attorney must provide copies of transcripts to
indigent clients upon termination of the representation whenever
necessary to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the client.3" The only
interesting question about this FAO is why it took seven years.
From this last comment, it should be obvious that the supreme court
and the Board do not issue FAO's in a very timely fashion. Th assist
readers in coping with the problems this creates for research, my
research assistant, Ms. Renate Downs, and I, with the pleasant
assistance of Ms. Carlene Raynor of the State Bar of Georgia, have tried
to provide a reasonably accurate listing of all FAO's issued by the
supreme court or proposed by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board since
the creation of our current procedures. This listing appears immediately
following the conclusion. I offer this listing in lieu of a detailed analysis
of the three FAO's issued this year although I do discuss FAQ 93-3
briefly to relate it to our theme.
II.

LEGAL FEES

A Penalty Clause for TerminationINonrefundableAdvance Fee
Contacts
Sadly, the first advice that recent law school graduates often get is:
"Get your fees up-front!" Seldom, however, is this practical warning
accompanied by good guidance on what the new lawyer should do with
these up-front fees once she has obtained them. Three years ago, the
supreme court advised in FAO 91-2 that the lawyer need not deposit

35. The supreme court issues FAO's as orders of the court even though the opinions are
prepared by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board. In the past, the court has made it clear
that it reviews the opinions prior to issuing them and, on occassion, it has modified
opinions or refused to issue them. For these reasons, I think it is correct to describe these
opinions as coming from the supreme court and I have done so throughout the survey.
36. Formal Op. 93-2 (1993). I have described this as an apparently partial opinion
because it begins as if it were going to explore numerous hypothetical situations that could
create conflicts for lawyers handling subrogation claims but then only considers one.
37. Formal Op. 93-4 (1993).

19941

LEGAL ETHICS

advance fee payments into a trust account.38 The court also warned,
however, that advance fee payments do not belong to the lawyer until
earned and that lawyers must return unearned fees upon termination
of the representation. 9 Is this return-of unearned fees required if the
client is willing to contract otherwise? Are contracts calling for
nonrefundable advance fees ethically permissible and legally enforceable? Recent ethical opinions in other jurisdictions4 and at least one
very recent appellate level decision in New York41 have ruled that they
are not.
In AFLAC, Inc. v. Williams,'2 the supreme court did not address
nonrefundable advance fees directly, but in determining that an attorney
may not recover damages under a penalty clause in an employment
contract upon termination of the representation by the,client, reversing
a court of appeals' opinion to the contrary,43 the supreme court seemed
to approve the arguments normally marshaled against nonrefundable
advance fees." Accordingly, AFLAC may best be understood as only an
egregious example of the wrongs associated with nonrefundable advance
fees, and if so, then this case calls this practice into question in Georgia

as well.
In 1987, John Amos, the Chair and Chief Executive Officer of AFLAC,
Inc., and Peter Williams, an attorney in private practice, entered a
seven-year employment contract." By the contact's terms, AFLAC was

38. Formal Op. 91-2 (1991). See also Roy M. Sobelson, Legal Ethics, 44 MERCER L.
REv. 281, 284-85 (expressing strong disagreement with the opinion).
39. Formal Op. 91-2, at 2.
40. See Ethics Commission of the Utah State Bar, Opinion 136, 1001 ABA/BNA
Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct, 8503 (1994); Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n Comm. on
Legal Ethics & Professional Responsibility, Opinion 93-20 (June 30, 1994); see also In re
Gastineau, 857 P.2d 136, 140 (Or. 1993) (non-refundable advance fee contracts are
improper if they result in unreasonable fees when the lawyer does not do the contracted
for legal work.)
41. In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (N.Y. 1994); see also Wong v. Michael
Kennedy, P.C., 853 F. Supp. 73, 79 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (applying Cooperman).
42. 264 Ga. 351, 444 S.E.2d 314 (1994). Your author was a co-author with Professors
Ray Patterson and Walter Phillips of the University of Georgia of an amicus brief filed in
this case arguing that a client's right of termination of a representation renders penalties
for termination invalid.
43. Williams v. AFLAC, Inc., 209 Ga. App. 841, 844-45, 434 S.E.2d 725, 729 (1993)
(reversing the trial court's determination that the contract was unenforceable as a matter
of law).
44. 264 Ga. at 353-54, 444 S.E.2d at 316-17. See generally Lester Brickman &
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable RetainersRevisited, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1993) and
Lester Brickman & Laurence Cunningham,NonrefundableRetainers:Impermissible Under
Fiduciary,Statutory, and ContractLaw, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 149 (1988).
45. 264 Ga. at 351-52, 444 S.E.2d at 315.
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to pay Williams a monthly amount for legal advice "as needed.'
Williams could not charge the company additionally for work done
unless some assigned project required an "extraordinary" amount of his
time.47 The contract also contained an automatic renewal provision,
operative in 1995, for an additional five years unless AFLAC terminated
the contract for just cause at least ninety days before the expiration of
the initial term. 48 Finally, in the provision that prompted this dispute,
Williams was to receive "as damages an amount equal to 50 percent of
the sums due under the remaining term, plus renewal of this agreement"
if AFLAC terminated the contract.49
In 1991, after the death of John Amos, AFLAC terminated the
contract, apparently as part of a process of centralizing its legal
services.' Williams demanded payment under the damages provision
of the contract.51 In response, AFLAC filed a declaratory action to
determine the validity of the damages provision and Williams counterclaimed for his payment.5 2 The trial court granted AFLAC summary
judgment and held that the damages provision was void and unenforceable.' Williams appealed to the court of appeals.
Writing for the court, Judge Blackburn first discussed the appropriateness of dealing with this issue in a declaratory judgment action (a
procedural matter not relevant to this survey), but then went on to find
error in the trial court's determination that the damages provision was
Judge Blackburn (citing to Henson v.
void and unenforceable."
American Family Corp." and an 1878 opinion beautifully written, as
always, by Justice Bleckley)s held, unsurprisingly, that contracts for
retaining fees are perfectly permissible and enforceable even if the
lawyer does not perform the services.57 Furthermore, the Judge stated
that the damages provisions of the contract did not create a penalty

46. Id. at 352, 444 S.E.2d at 316.
47. Id.
48. A New Jersey court recently struck down a retainer agreement with an automatic
renewal provision requiring the client to give six months notice to terminate. The court
said this was similar to a non-refundable fee agreement in that the notice requirement was
too limiting of the client's right to terminate. Cohen v. Radio-Electronics Officers Union,
N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., No. A-5442-9313 (July 28, 1994).

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
209 Ga. App. at 842, 434 S.E.2d at 727.
Id.
Id. at 841, 434 S.E.2d at 726.
Id., 434 S.E.2d at 726-27. The trial court did not announce the basis for its ruling.
Id. at 843, 434 S.E.2d at 728.

55.

171 Ga. App. 724, 321 S.E.2d 205 (1984).

56. McNulty, George & Hall v. Pruden, 62 Ga. 135 (1878).
57. 209 Ga. App. at 843, 434 S.E.2d at 728.
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unenforceable as a matter of public policy, but rather it created
enforceable liquidated damages. 58 Judge Blackburn added, however,
that AFLAC did not owe the portion of the damages determined by the
renewal provision because AFLAC's assent to the renewal was required."9 He then stated, rather cryptically, that, "[oirdinarily, a client
is free to terminate its employment of an attorney at any time,"60 citing
for this proposition White v. Aiken."'
Evidently, the practical effect of the client's right to terminate was
limited under this analysis to gutting that part of the contract calling for
damages determined by the renewal provision. None of this, however,
is very clear in the opinion. In any event, Judge Blackburn limited the
Williams' damages to the portion determined by the term of the initial
retainer, that is, 50 percent of whatever had not been paid on the first
seven years.62
On a writ of certiorari, the supreme court addressed the issue of
"whether a client must pay legal fees to an attorney under a long-term
Reversing the court
retainer contract after terminating the contract.'
of appeals, the supreme court held that "an attorney may not recover
damages under a penalty clause when a client 4exercises the legal right
to terminate the attorney's retainer contract."
Before turning to the supreme court's justification for its holding, we
should first notice what has not happened here. Ordinarily, we would
expect appellate courts to distinguish between general retainers that are
agreements to be "on call," and special retainers providing fees, in
advance or as billed, for work to be done. Both appellate courts ignored
this distinction, yet it is a very important one in this context.6 Under
the usual rules, general retainers are earned (as Justice Bleckley said
in the case cited by Judge Blackburn) "when the attorney dedicates
himself by contract to his client's service, thereby cutting himself off
from employment by the adverse party."' Apparently, and this is only
surmise, the court of appeals considered the employment contract
between AFLAC and Williams to be a general retainer, or so the court's

58. Id. at 844, 434 S.E.2d at 728. Penalties are unenforceable as a matter of public
policy.
59. Id., 434 S.E.2d at 729.
60. Id.
61. 197 Ga. 29, 28 S.E.2d 263 (1943).
62. 209 Ga. App. at 844, 434 S.E.2d at 729.
63. 264 Ga. at 351-52, 444 S.E.2d at 315.
64. Id. at 352, 444 S.E.2d at 315.
65. See, e.g., Wong v. Michael Kennedy P.C., 853 F. Supp. 73, 79 (E.D. N.Y. 1994).
66. McNulty, George & Hall v. Pruden, 62 Ga. 136, 141 as cited in Williams v. AFLAC,
Inc., 209 Ga. App. at 843, 434 S.E.2d at 728.
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choice of citations would lead us to believe. If so, then the court's
willingness to enforce the damages provision is not surprising. Under
a statutory provision that the court did not consider,"' Williams would
have been entitled to 50 percent of the entire contractual amount at the
moment he agreed to be bound to AFLAC as his client, absent any
contractual agreement to the contrary, unless he, and not the client,
later withdrew without justification.'
But if this is the court's rationale, it has stretched the definition of
general retainer beyond recognition. It seems straightforward from the
terms of the agreement that AFLAC was paying Williams for work to be
done. Note, for example, that he could only ask for additional compensation if a project would involve an "extraordinary" amount of time.6"
Surely this is a special, and not a general, retainer, and if so, the court
of appeals analysis is non appropo.
If the court of appeals was too quick to assume that this was a general
retainer, the supreme court was just as quick in assuming it was a
special one-again without any discussion of the distinction. Nevertheless, because this is a better assumption, the supreme court's analysis
is directed to the truer issue here: Is a contract that obligates a client to
pay to exercise the right to terminate a client-lawyer relationship
enforceable? Justice Fletcher, writing for a unanimous supreme
court,
70
said no; it is not enforceable as a matter of public policy.

According to Justice Fletcher, termination by the client is not a
damage-provoking breach of a contract at all because we read into each
contract between a client and a lawyer an "absolute right" of the client
to terminate the relationship at will.

1

We read this in, he said,

because the relationship between a lawyer and a client is a special one
of trust.7 21

When the trust is gone, the relationship is over; and clients

must be free to make this so.'3 We would be ignoring the fiduciary
nature of this relationship, he went on, if we treated the contract
between a lawyer and a client as a conventional commercial one.74
Thus, "[the court's] obligation to regulate the legal profession in the
public's interest causes us to favor AFLAC's freedom in ending the

67.

O.C.GA. § 15-19-11 (1994).

68. Id.
69. 264 Ga. at 352, 444 S.E.2d at 316. See supra note 42. See, e.g., In re National
Magazine Publishing Co., U.S. Bankr. Ct., No. 94-10859 (N. Ohio, Sept. 14, 1994).

70. 264 Ga. at 353-54, 444 S.E.2d at 317.
71. Id. at 353, 444 S.E.2d at 316.
72. Id.

73. Id.
74. Id
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attorney-client relationship without financial, penalty over Williams'
right to enforce the damages provision in his retainer contract."75

Now, as a regulatory function exercise, the opinion could have ended
there, but Justice Fletcher continued. This is the same conclusion, he
said, that the court would reach under generally applicable contact
law.76 By applying the standard test for determining whether a
contract provision is enforceable as liquidated damages, 7 Justice
Fletcher found that Williams contracted for an unenforceable penalty
(and not liquidated damages) because "the damages provision is not a
reasonable estimate of Williams' damages and instead is [intended as]
a penalty imposed to punish AFLAC. "Ts Obviously unable to resist a

parting blow, Justice Fletcher also noted that the client would have to
pay the attorney under this damage provision even if the client
terminated the relationship for embezzlement of client funds!79
It is, I hope, uncommon for a Georgia lawyer to contract for damages
upon termination on conditions as demanding as the ones Wllliams
insisted upon, and even more uncommon for a sophisticated client to
accept. It is, however, not at all uncommon in Georgia for lawyers to
contract with their clients for nonrefundable advance fees, and the
practice is increasing, or so I am told. Essentially, these contracts call
for advance fees for specified work to be done. The lawyer does not

75. Id., 444 S.E.2d at 316-17.
76. Id. at 354, 444 S.E.2d at 317.
77. The standard test, according to Justice Fletcher, is that three factors must exist for
a damages provision to be enforceable. 'The injury must be difficult to estimate accurately,
the parties must intend to provide damages instead of a penalty, and the sum must be a
reasonable estimate of probable loss." AFLAC v. Williams, 264 Ga. at 354, 444 S.E.2d at
317 (citing Southeastern Land Fund, Inc. v. Real Estate World, Inc., 237 Ga. 227, 230, 227
S.E.2d 340, 343 (1976)). The court in Southeastern, considering whether a stipulation in
a real estate sales contract requiring the payment of earnest money was a provision for
liquidated damages or a penalty, held that
[WIhether a provision represents liquidated damages or a penalty does not depend
upon the label the parties place on the payment but rather depends on the effect
it was intended to have and whether it was reasonable .... Where the parties
do not undertake to estimate damages in advance of the breach and instead
provide for both a forfeiture (penalty) plus, actual damages, [the agreement]...
is an unenforceable penalty.
SoutheasternLand Fund,237 Ga. at 228,227 S.E.2d at 342. In Georgia, when the contract
is ambiguous, "the courts favor the construction which holds the stipulated sum to be a
penalty, and limits the recovery to the amount of damages actually shown, rather than a
liquidation of the damages." Mayor & Council of Brunswick v. Aetna Indemnity Co., 4 Ga.
App. 722, 728, 62 S.E. 474, 478 (1908) (as cited in SoutheasternLand Fund, 237 Ga. at 231,
227 S.E.2d at 344).
78. 264 Ga. at 354, 444 S.E.2d at 317.
79. Id. at 354 n.6, 444 S.E.2d at 317 n.6.
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return these fees to the client if the client terminates the relationship
without cause.s' The problems with such contracts are twofold: First,
in some circumstances these contracts may have the same effect as the
one voided in AFLAC, that is, they may operate as a penalty for a
client's exercise of the right to withdraw. Second, the fees that are, in
essence, accelerated upon the client's withdrawal may subject the
attorney to discipline for violating ethical standards prohibiting either
"unreasonable" or "clearly excessive" fees. sl (They may also be undefendable in a subsequent action brought by the client to recover the
accelerated fees because the fees are not "reasonable.")
The question we are left with in Georgia after AFLAC then is to what
extent has the supreme court determined that nonrefundable advance
fees are "unethical and unconscionable," 2 as one recent opinion
described them, and unenforceable.s' It seems that if we ignore the
portion of the damages to be determined by the renewal term of the
contract, something the court of appeals found unenforceable and which
seemed unimportant to the supreme court's opinion (other than as

80. The Georgia Standards of Conduct prohibit lawyers from withdrawing from
employment without refunding promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has not
been earned. It does not seem to apply when the withdrawing party is the client. GA.
RULES OF CT. ANN., Bar Rule 4-102, Standard 23 (1994).
81. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (1992) and GA. RULES
OF CT. ANN., Bar Rule 4-102, Standard 31 (1994). See also Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n Comm.
on Legal Ethics & Professional Responsibility, Opinion 93-102 (June 30, 1994). For
example, in a recent article in The Wall Street Journal on this issue, James Fox Miller, a
Hollywood, Florida, divorce lawyer and former president of the Florida Bar Association,
confessed that he had kept nonrefundable advance fee payments of between $10,000 and
$15,000 for only a few days of work. Mr. Miller thought he was justified in doing so
because the clients had the benefit of his reputation in forcing the opposing spouse to cave
in to demands. Now, Mr. Miller may be quite right that his reputation alone is worth
something in negotiations, but the original advance fee payments were presumably based
upon this reputation and the work he was to do for his client. If the fee remains the same
when he does not do the work, Mr. Miller, in order to show that the fee was reasonable,
and therefore ethical under Florida's Rules of Professional Conduct (Fla. St. Bar R. 41.5(a)), must demonstrate that he grossly undercharged his clients initially and that his
reputation alone was worth $10,000 or $15,000 or, in the alternative, that his work is
worthless. See Junda Woo, Nonrefundable Lawyers' Fees, Barredby New York State Court
As Unethical, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1993, at B10. Of course, disciplinary actions for
unreasonable fees are quite rare, but they do happen and they do happen in Florida. See,
e.g., Florida State Bar v. Moriber, 314 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1975). See also In re Gastineau, 857
P.2d 136 (Or. 1993).
82. See In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. (1994) and Wong v. Michael Kennedy,
P.C., 853 F. Supp. 73 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). See also supra note 42, at 64.
83. See also Ethics Commission of Utah State Bar, Opinion 136, 1001 ABA/BNA
Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct, 8503 (1994) and In re Gastineau, 857 P.2d 136
(Ore. 1993).

1994]

LEGAL ETHICS

317

additional evidence of the parties' intentS'), then we are left with a
contractual right to collect fifty percent of all remaining sums due under
the contract. At the very beginning of the term, Williams had a
contractual right to retain fifty percent of the total fees due under the
contract.' There is no legal difference (albeit there is a practical one)
between this contractual right and the receipt of a nonrefundable
advance of fifty percent of the fees. In fact, collecting one hundred
percent of fees in advance as nonrefundable, as is done in some
nonrefundable advance fee contracts, could be worse than the conduct
condemned in AFLAC. A client bound by such a nonrefundable advance
fee arrangement could exercise her "absolute right to discharge the
attorney and terminate the relation at any time, even without cause,8
only at the expense of forfeiting all fees owed under the contract.8 7
So after AFLAC, does the court's "obligation to regulate the legal
profession in the public's interests " 88 mean that the court will favor a
client's "freedom in ending the attorney-client relationship without
penalty"8 9 over an attorney's contractual right to retain unearned
advance fees? And, if not, can a good distinction from AFLAC be made?
The supreme court's contract analysis in AFLAC would also seem to
prohibit nonrefundable advance fee agreements as creating unenforceable penalties rather than enforceable liquidated damages. This is
because nonrefundable fees would seldom meet the requirement of being
a "reasonable estimate of probable loss" since the amount the client
forfeits depends entirely on the amount of fees earned by the time of
termination.
The simple solution to this problem for lawyers with a legitimate
interest in preventing losses suffered when a client exercises her
"absolute right" to terminate the relationship is to avoid nonrefundable
advance fees altogether and to design instead a contractual method of
redress that honestly attempts the difficult task of measuring the
probable losses the attorney will suffer upon termination. Under such
an arrangement, the lawyer would return unearned advance fees to the

84. 264 Ga. at 354 n.5, 444 S.E.2d at 317 n.5.
85. Id. at 352, 444 S.E.2d at 315.
86. Id. at 353, 444 S.E.2d at 316 (quoting White v. Aiken, 197 Ga. 29, 32, 28 S.E.2d
263, 265 (1943)).

87. It is true, of course, that the AFLAC contract talked of "damages" for "termination
for just cause" (and thus the court's discussion of termination not being a breach of the
contract was appropriate) and nonrefundable fee contracts talk instead of a forfeiture
(rather than damages for a breach), but surely this is a distinction of form only because the
substance is the same.
88. 264 Ga. at 353, 444 S.E.2d at 316.
89. Id.
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client, but retain liquidated damages. I know of no contractual bar to
doing this. Generally applicable contract law would seem to permit an
attorney to collect from the client, as liquidated damages advanced
against a client's termination without just cause, some portion of the
value of work that the lawyer declines (because of over-commitment
fears or conflict of interests) and other losses that the lawyer may suffer
due solely to the lawyer's representation of the client. These losses are,
of course, difficult to measure-thus meeting the first of the three
Georgia requirements for liquidated damages.' ° They would not be
imposed as a penalty upon the client, but rather as protection against
projected losses-thus meeting the second requirement for liquidated
damages.9 ' And, if the contractual method of determining the amount
bears some reasonable relationship to actual damages-the third and
final requirement-the court's contractual concerns should be fully
My guess is that when these contractual concerns are
satisfied.92
satisfied we will find the court's regulatory concerns will be satisfied as
well. This "guess" requires some elaboration and in doing so, we return
necessarily to our theme of the struggle between the two functions of the
appellate courts in Georgia.
One regulatory concern the appellate courts should have with
nonrefundable advance fees agreements, a concern briefly mentioned
above,' is the possibility that the forfeiture of nonrefundable advance
fees can produce "clearly excessive" or "unreasonable" fees when the
representation is terminated by the client. The supreme court did not
address this concern in AFLAC. Nevertheless, it is a perfectly valid one.
If, however, lawyers follow the course I recommend of drafting advance
fee contracts that honestly attempt to estimate the damages they would
suffer should the client withdraw, this concern will disappear." Thus,
my "guess" is at least justified to the extent of this regulatory concern.
But the second regulatory concern with nonrefundable advance fee
agreements, the concern the supreme court did address in AFLAC,
remains. Even an advance payment of estimated damages could. be
construed as an impermissible restriction on a client's "absolute right"
to terminate the relationship although contract law permits such an
arrangement. Some language in AFLAC is certainly conducive to such
a broad reading of the case. For example, the supreme court stated that

90. Id. at 354, 444 S.E.2d at 317. See supra note 77, at 67.
91. 264 Ga. at 354, 444 S.E.2d at 317. See supra note 77, at 67.
92. 264 Ga. at 354, 444 S.E.2d at 317. See supra note 77, at 67.
93. See supra note 81, at 68.
94. It would disappear because in such an arrangement the fees charged for work done
could not be construed to have changed at all upon termination by the client.
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in exercising its duty to regulate the profession the court must "assure
the public that the practice of law will be a professional service and not
simply a commercial enterprise,"' and that lawyer-client contracts,
therefore, cannot be forced into the "conventional status of commercial
contracts."9 Discharging an attorney is not, the court says, a breach
of the contract at all.'
It is an implied right that must be given
priority over the enforcement of "damages provisions" in such contracts.98
What the court may be saying here is that lawyers have ethical
obligations to their clients that go beyond those of ordinary commercial
contract law and that the court is willing to impose these special ethical
obligations upon lawyers as a matter of law as part of its regulatory
function. In the terms of our theme, here the court seems to accept the
hierarchy of the regulatory function as binding upon it and superior to
that of the judicial fimction. Perhaps this means that lawyers must be
willing to suffer some damages upon termination of the representation
by the client so that the client's "absolute right" to terminate remains
completely unfettered by economic concerns. Otherwise, the special
ethical obligations the court is imposing upon lawyers do not go beyond
those of ordinary commercial contract law at all."
To see why this could be the case under AFLAC, look at how a cynic
would read this case if this analysis is not correct. If there is no
difference in results between the norms of the judicial function and the
norms of the regulatory function in this area, if, what is really going on
in AFLAC is nothing more than a routine penalty versus liquidated
damages issue, then the court's talk of the practice of law as a "profes-

95. 264 Ga. at 352,444 S.E.2d at 316 (citing First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 Ga.
844, 845, 302 S.E.2d 674, 675 (1983)).

96. Id. at 353, 444 S.E.2d at 316.

97. Id.
98. Id., 444 SXE.2d at 316-17.
99. One should not assume that a court's turning to ethical obligations, or at least to
ethical regulations, will always mean that the client will obtain an outcome better than
what the client could have obtained under contract law. See, eg., Smith v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 630 A.2d 820 (N.J. App. Super. Ct. Div. 1993), a case very much related to our
issue, but on the other side of the contract. In Smith a law firm withdrew from the
representation of the client on a contingent fee when it realized that the representation
was going to cost the firm more than it would be likely to collect. The appellate court said
that ABA Model Rule 1.6(bX5) permits lawyers to withdraw when the case would create
an unreasonable financial burden. Therefore, the court went on, we must make this
assessment here. The court argued that if this had been on an hourly basis, everyone
would have agreed that the case was too expensive to pursue. With a contingent fee, the
client has no incentive to stop and so some limits must be imposed by the courts. Id. at
832.
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sional service and not simply a commercial enterprise," and "a calling
that demands adherence to the public interest as'the foremost obligation
of the practitioner," and the relationship between the lawyer and client
as "a special one of trust," that is so "unique," that the client has an
"absolute right" to terminate it for any reason-all this proud talk-is
disingenuous, self-serving, puffery.' 0 Our cynic could have a field day
with: "Our obligation to regulate the legal profession in the public's
interest causes us to favor AFLAC's freedom in ending the... relationship without financial penalty over Williams' right to enforce the
damages provision in his retainer contract" 0 1 if it is understood that
Williams in fact had no right to enforce the damages provision because
it called for an ordinarily unenforceable penalty! Such a cynic might tell
us that the court has only announced that lawyers are subject to the
same legal rules everyone 10else
is and, going on sarcastically, that this is
2
quite an accomplishment!
I am not our cynic and yet I too believe, as my guess suggests, that
there is probably little difference in results between the hierarchies of
norms of the regulatory function and of the judicial function on this
issue. This is, as I described in the introduction, one of the "more
harmonious" situations in which the appellate courts are only confused
over which function is to be given the greatest expression of allegiance.
(And in this one the supreme court has tried to split the middle.) If a
lawyer is careful to comply with contract law on penalties, I believe that
the courts will enforce damage provisions in advance fee contracts
although this certainly places some financial fetters on the client's right
to terminate the representation. I believe this is true because it would
be quite unusual for the appellate courts to do otherwise. Even the most
ardent critic of nonrefundable advance fee contracts has never suggested
that lawyers cannot anticipate legitimate damages contractually in this
way.1 3 We could wish for a profession in which lawyers truly placed

100, 264 Ga. at 352-53, 444 S.E.2d at 316.
101, Id. at 353, 444 S.E.2d at 316-17.
102. Our cynic might be prompted to say that by tactics like those of the lawyer in
American Home Assurance Co. v. Golomb, 606 N.E.2d 793 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) in which a
medical malpractice lawyer contracted for a contingent fee with an agreement to "hold the
lawyer harmless" from any reduction required by a statute limiting contingent fees in
medical malpractice cases. Id. at 795, 797. The court voided the contract and denied all
recovery including in quantum meruit. Id. at 797. So the law applied to this lawyer and
with a regulatory vengeance!
103. See generally Lester Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable
Retainers Revisited, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1993) and Lester Brickman & Lawrence
A.Cunningham, NonrefundableRetainers:Impermissible Under Fiduciary,Statutory, and
Contract Law, 57 FoRDHAM L. REV. 149 (1988).
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the interests-even the unfair interests-of their clients over their own
financial interests to this extent, but it is to my mind, unlikely that
courts will try to create such a profession by fiat.
Nevertheless, this does not lead me to the cynical conclusion that the
supreme court's talk of ethical obligations of lawyers more demanding
than the law is, in our cynic's venomous terms, "disingenuous, selfserving, puffery." It is important I think, for the court to recognize that
there are reasons for a lawyer to respect a client's freedom to terminate
a representation other than legal ones even if these other reasons
produce the same results. The reason we do certain things as lawyers
is extremely important to our understanding of who we are as a
profession. There is a very real and important characterological
difference in a profession that does not demand nonrefundable advance
fees because contract law prohibits it and one that does not do so
because it is something good lawyers do not do. I think the supreme
court is trying to hold on to this difference in the character of our acts
by announcing both regulatory and judicial function reasons for its
decision in AFLAC.104
B. Contractingfor Costs and Expenses
Another legal fees case decided this year by the court of appeals
stands in sharp contract to AFLAC. In Donohue v. Green,10 5 the court
seemed to go to great lengths to restrict the issue to the hierarchy of the
judicial function. Donohue, an attorney, sued his former client, Green,
for costs and expenses he had advanced in an automobile accident case
taken on a contingent fee.'e After losing badly-the trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants-Donohue
demanded payment of expenses and costs.10 7 Green failed to respond
and Donohue filed to recover fees in quantum meruit and alleged Green
had terminated the representation."s When Green answered by
referring the trial court to Donohue's letter to him reporting that the
appeal had been unsuccessful, Donohue amended his complaint to ask
instead for a recovery of costs and expenses pursuant to a paragraph in
104. There are other reasons to hold on to this difference. For example, judicial
function reasons, because they are based on laws of general applicability, can be changed
by the legislators while regulatory function reasons, based on ethical rules of special
applicability to lawyers, cannot. Also, while the norms of both functions seem harmonious
here, they may not always be so, they may develop differently even on this issue and, if so,
it is important to announce both reasons at the beginning of the development.
105. 209 Ga. App. 381, 433 S.E.2d 431 (1993).
106. Id. at 381, 433 S.E.2d at 431-32.
107. Id., 433 S.E.2d at 432.
108. Id.
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the fee contract providing that the client would "pay an amount equal
or equivalent to 33-1/3 percent of whatever amount may be recovered or
collected.., on said claim without suit, and 40 percent if suit is filed,
The trial court ruled that this
plus all advances or expenses."'°c
paragraph was ambiguous, construing it against Donohue as the
drafter" ° Writing for the court of appeals, Judge Smith affirmed.'
There is nothing remarkable about this holding. It may prompt a few
lawyers to reexamine their fee contracts, and this is certainly a good and
a needed thing,"2 but the analysis is routine. 13 The court stated the
existence of an ambiguity is a question of law and the trial court was
correct in its legal determination." 4 This paragraph was ambiguous;
In
and parol evidence was not admissible to clarify the ambiguity'
interpretation, however, trial courts must consider the intention of the
parties and they can use the surrounding circumstances to prove
these."" In this case, the trial court found that Donohue informed
Green orally that he would not owe any expenses if there was no
recovery.1 If Donohue believed instead that the contract provided he
could recover costs and expenses, then no meeting of the minds occurred
and thus, no contract was formed.'
What is worth remarking about is how different from AFLAC this
analysis is! It is very well established as a matter of public policy that
courts will closely scrutinize contracts between lawyers and clients as
part of their regulatory function.1 9 This scrutiny is, in theory at least,
different from the scrutiny prompted by the legal maxim that courts will
construe contracts against the drafter, a maxim the trial court relied
upon in Donohue. In recognition of this theoretical difference, most
appellate courts routinely announce some regulatory basis for their

109. Id. (emphasis added)
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. It has been my experience in reviewing fee contracts brought to me by law
students, law clerks, and lawyers that large numbers of these contracts contain violations
obvious to someone familiar with this area of law and ethical regulation. The situation is
not unlike the heyday of Truth-in-Lending when it was possible to find violations in every
loan agreement because lawyers paid so little attention to Truth-in-Lending regulations.
113. The case does, however, have its own conceptual difficulties as a matter of contract
law.
114. 209 Ga. App. at 382, 433 S.E.2d at 432.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119.

See generally CHARLEs W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcS 209-23 (1986). See

also e.g., Jacobson v. Sassower, 489 N.E.2d 1283 (N.Y. 1985).
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decisions in client-lawyer contract cases. But in Donohue the court of
appeals studiously avoided any reference to its regulatory function and
instead analyzed this contract as if it had the "conventional status of a
commercial contract," so belittled in AFLAC. 1"
As if to highlight its reliance solely on its judicial function, the court
added that it agreed with the trial court's ruling on the relevance of
ethical regulatory standards.121 Georgia State Bar Directory Rule 5103(C), prohibiting an attorney from advancing costs and expenses
unless the client remains ultimately liable for them had "no bearing" on
the case, the court said. 2 2 If the contract drawn here violates this
Directory Rule, the court continued, "such a violation properly addresses
itself to the State Bar."123
Apparently, Donohue had argued the contract should not be construed
to be in violation of the ethical regulations of the profession. Perhaps he
also argued that these ethical regulations were indirect evidence of his
intent, that is, that it is less likely that he would have intended to enter
into a contract that subjected him to discipline. Finally, he may have
argued that in the absence of a meeting of the minds the court should
impose costs and expenses upon the client because not to do so runs
contrary to ethical regulations and contrary to the custom of the trade.
All of these arguments seem logically relevant to the issue.
But the court was having none of this. The premise that must be
accepted if these arguments are to be relevant is that clients must bear
some of the costs of protecting the integrity of the profession. In other
words, the court of appeals could have easily said, as the supreme court
did in AFLAC, that as a matter of public policy we read ethical
restrictions into contracts between clients lawyers. Thus, they could find
in this contract a prohibition on payment of costs and expenses by the
attorney even if this worked to the financial disadvantage of this
particular client. It may be true that courts acting in their regulatory
function sometimes impose the profession's public interest burdens upon
clients,' 24 but in a case like this one the court was simply not going to

120.
121.

264 Ga. at 353, 444 S.E.2d at 316.
209 Ga. App. at 382, 433 S.E.2d at 433.

122. Id.
123. Id. Of course, the court of appeals has cited a Directory Rule of the Georgia Code
of Professional Responsibility, a provision adopted in Georgia for guidance only. If there
is to be a referral to the State Bar, it would have to be for a violation of Standard of
Conduct 32. Ignoring the hierarchy of the norms of the competing function is common in
cases like these.
124. For example, clients often bear some of the costs of disqualification. Clients also
bear the increased transactional costs involved in conflict of interests rules, for example,
when opposing spouses are forced by these rules to hire separate attorneys.
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permit Donohue to use the ethical regulations of the profession,
regulations designed to protect client's from their attorney's conflicting
interests, to his own financial advantage.
The broader question that both Donohue, by its refusal to recognize
any connection between ethical regulations and the interpretation of a
client-lawyer contracts, and AFLAC, by reading in an ethical restriction-if not an ethical regulation--on all client-lawyer contracts, ask is:
What is the legal role, if any, of the ethical norms of our profession?
(This broader question is a variation on our theme.) Although this
broader question arises here, it does not appear manageable in clientlawyer contract cases, an area the judicial function normally dominates.
Perhaps the sharp differences between AFLAC and Donohue alone are
enough to tell us this. This broader question also arises in legal
malpractice, however, where judicial and regulatory functions necessarily combine. Will the appellate courts find narrower issues there with
which to fence in this question and perhaps confront the struggle
between our competing hierarchies in a more manageable way?
Ill.

LEGAL MALPRACTICE

A.

Use of Ethical Standards
For many years, the appellate courts have told us that, as a general
rule, violations of ethical regulations, standing alone, cannot be the basis
for malpractice.'25 In one way this is obvious. The elements of
malpractice require proof of damages and causation in addition to proof
of professional misconduct. 2 ' If all the appellate courts mean by the
125. See Tante v. Herring, 211 Ga. App. 322, 439 S.E.2d 5 (1993). 'The correct
statement of the law from the cases Tante relies upon is that 'standing alone' a violation
of a bar standards [sic] will not support a legal malpractice claim." Id. at 328, 439 S.E.2d

at 11. This case was decided during the period covered by this survey and is discussed in
the text below. See infra note 154. See also Roberts v. Langdale, 185 Ga. App. 122, 363
S.E.2d 591 (1987).
126. See, e.g., Whitehead v. Cuflie, 185 Ga. App. 351, 353, 364 S.E.2d 87, 89 (1987).

It is well-established Georgia law that before an action for a tort will lie, the
plaintiff must show he sustained injury or damage as a result of the negligent act

or omission to act in some duty owed to him ....

Although nominal damages can

be awarded where there has been an injury but the injury is small, ...

where

there is no evidence of injury accompanying the tort, an essential element of the
tort is lacking, thereby entitling the defendant to judgment in his favor.
Whitehead is correct if the court's understanding of nominal damages is also correct. See,
e.g., dissenting opinion of Judge Murray. Id. at 354, 364 S.E.2d at 90. See also Nix v.
Crews, 200 Ga. App. 58,59,406 S.E.2d 566,567 (1991). "In a legal malpractice action, the
client has the burden of establish three elements: ... (3) that such negligence was the
proximate cause of damage to the plaintiff." Rogers v. Norvell, 174 Ga. App. 453, 457, 330

19941

LEGAL ETHICS

325

general rule is that the plaintiff must also prove damages and causation,127 then this general rule offers no limitation on malpractice
claims other than the limitation that the requirement of proof of all
elements provides in all tort cases."m Of course, requiring proof of
harm may limit which ethical regulations can serve as the basis for
malpractice because the violations of some ethical regulations are not

S.E.2d 392, 395 (1985). See also Findley v. Davis, 202 Ga. App. 332, 338, 414 S.E.2d 317,
321 (1991). "An action for legal malpractice cannot be maintained where there is no
evidence that the breach of the professional duty proximately caused injury, loss or damage
to the client." See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of Davis.
(The court of appeals was reversed in Davis v. Findley, 262 Ga. 612, 422 S.E.2d 859
(1992)). See generallyCHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHiCS 209-23 (1986) "Legal
malpractice law can thus be regarded as a special application to lawyers of the general
fourfold negligence formulae of duty, breach of duty, proximate causation, and damages."
Id. at 209.
127. See, e.g., Huntington v. Fishman, 212 Ga. App. 27, 441 S.E.2d 444 (1994), a
malpractice case, decided during the year covered by this survey, on the issue of whether
the trial court erred in granting a summary judgment for the defendant based on a failure
of the plaintiff to show that defendant-attorney's negligence was the proximate cause of the
plaintiffs loss. The court of appeals ruled for the plaintiff-appellant and reversed the trial
court's grant of the motion.
128. See Hendricks v. Davis, 196 Ga. App. 286, 395 S.E.2d 632 (1990).
The basis of Hendricks' malpractice claim against Davis was that he acted under
a conflict of interest because of his representation of both Hendricks and Field
Properties, and because of his personal involvement. Although Hendricks may
have presented evidence of Davis' violation of the Georgia Cede of Professional
Responsibility, such a violation alone cannot support Hendricks' action seeking
money damages. In order for her to recover on the legal malpractice claim,
Hendricks had to prove that Davis' alleged ethical violations proximately caused
the deprivation of her right to receive 25 percent of the net profits ....
Id. at 287, 395 S.E.2d at 633-34 (citation omitted). The proposition that malpractice
actions in Georgia may be based on violations of ethical regulations if harm is shown was
argued as the correct interpretation of Georgia case law by Professors Ray Patterson and
Ray Phillips in their amici brief in Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C., 212
Ga. App. 560, 442 S.E.2d 466 (1994), cert. granted. The supreme court has not issued its
opinion in this case. It has been assigned to the September 1994, oral argument calendar
and an opinion should be issued about the time of publication of this edition of the Law
Review. Your author was a co-author with Professors Patterson and Phillips of an amicus
brief seeking certiorari to the supreme court from the court of appeals decision in Allen v.
Lefkoff, but did not join with them in the brief on the issues submitted after certiorari was
granted on May 9, 1994. Your author has no financial or other interest in the outcome of
the appeal nor was he involved in it in any way other than as amicus.
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likely to proximately cause harm to particular clients.' 29 Even if this

is so, however, this limitation is a very minor one.
This general rule has recently been called into question as a lingering

effect of the infamous case of Davis v. Findley. 8 As a direct result,
the appellate courts may soon face our broader question: What is the
legal role, if any, of the ethical norms of our profession?
In Davis, a malpractice claim against Davis based on an allegation of
overcharging, the supreme court reversed a decision by the court of
appeals permitting the claim.'' The supreme court announced that:
[Tihe Code of Professional Responsibility provides specific sanctions for
... professional misconduct... [but] it does not establish civil liability
of attorneys ... nor does it create remedies in consequence thereof
.... Inasmuch as the appellee seeks to support his cause of action for
malpractice solely in reliance upon duties imposed by the Code... the
conclusion by the Court of Appeals to the contrary must be overruled
and the judgment of the trial court affirmed.1"2
This announcement seemed superfluous to the appeal because the
court of appeals had agreed that violation of an ethical rule, such as

Standard 31 prohibiting illegal or clearly excessive fees, did not,
standing alone, state a claim for malpractice."3 However, the court of
appeals had gone on to say: "This principle, however, does not bar
appellant's malpractice action."' The allegation of excessive fees here
did state a claim for legal malpractice, the court found, because:
In our view, appellant has made.., a showing [of all the elements of
a malpractice case.] The Georgia Cede of Professional Conduct in
Standard 31 prohibits a lawyer from entering into an agreement for
a "clearly excessive fee." The affidavit of [the expert witness],
submitted with the complaint, alleges that appellees' collection of
excessive fees from appellant deviated from "the required standard of
skill, care and diligence normally possessed and utilized by other

129. For example, the Standards of Conduct concerning bar admission may be designed
to prevent harm to clients generally, but a violation of these Standards are not likely to be
the proximate cause of harm to a particular client. I have said may in the text because,
as argued below, the concept of harm is so expansive that even this one example may not
work.
130. 262 Ga. 612, 422 S.E.2d 859 (1992). See also Sobelson, supra note 39, at 291 and
Roy M. Sobelson, Legal Ethics, 45 MERCER L. REV. 287, 294 (1993).
131. 262 Ga. 612, 422 S.E.2d 859.
132. Id. at 613, 422 S.E.2d at 861. At the end of the opinion, the supreme court
reminded the parties that fee arbitration was available through the bar. See discussion
infra note 136.
133. 202 Ga. App. at 336, 414 S.E.2d at 320.

134. Id.
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attorneys who represent clients in real estate ...
same or similar circumstances."'

327
matters under the

If we are to read this finding consistently with the court's recognition
of the general rule (that a violation of an ethical standard, standing
alone, is insufficient for malpractice), then the court must mean that the
claim here is not based solely on Standard 31, but that Standard 31 was
only evidence of the general proposition testified to by the expert
witness, that is, that the lawyer deviated from ordinary professional
standards of care.'
If this is correct, then the court of appeals is
reading "standards of care" with a very broad view of what lawyers owe

to their clients. Under this broad view, our standards of care include
care in assessing the fees to be charged. Such a broad view stands in

direct opposition to a narrower (and far more common) view of "standards of care" that would strictly limit malpractice actions to the
mishandling of a client's legal affairs.'37 Under this narrower view,
the supreme court's concerns with reliance solely upon duties created by
ethical regulations as a basis for malpractice is well taken; if, however,

the broader view is correct then it is not well taken at all, and the court
of appeals' determination that the ethical regulations in issue here are
evidence of the relevant standards of care of our profession is undoubted-

ly correct.

135. Id. at 337, 414 S.E.2d at 320.
136. Part of the difficulty here is that the ethical regulations and the law governing
attorney fees are so interwoven as to be almost indistinguishable. For example, illegal fees
are also unethical. (GA. RULEs OF CT. ANN., Bar Rule 4-102, Standard 31(a) (1994). Does
this mean, for example, that the fees found to be illegal (as in violation of contract law
prohibiting penalties) in AFLAC would now also subject an attorney to discipline for an
ethical violation? One would think so. In determining whether a fee is reasonable, and
therefore illegal in the sense that it is not collectable, courts have routinely referred to
factors set forth in the ethical codes sometimes even adopting these lists of factors to be
considered as a matter of law. Does this mean that a fee that is determined to be
unethical in that it fails the 'clearly excessive" test is necessarily illegal and, therefore
unenforceable? One would think so. Does this mean that the ethical and legal standards
here are the same? One would think so, but many courts and formal advisory opinions
have read these rules differently finding that fees that are unreasonable as a matter of law
may still not be enough to subject an attorney to discipline.
137. See infra notes 154-84 and accompanying text for a discussion ofTante v. Herring,
211 Ga. App. 322,439 S.E.2d 5 (date). See also Sobelson, supranote 130, at 292. Professor
Sobelson argues that malpractice claims are usually premised on a narrower view of
standards of care. Studies of the services lawyers provide indicate that the quality of a
lawyer's practice is more dependent upon the more intangible aspects of the representation
than on technical proficiencies. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, Lawyer Competence and the
Law Schools, 4 U. ARK. LrmE ROCK L.J. 1 (1981).
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In any event, the court of appeals must have been puzzled by the
supreme court's reversal of its decision in Davis. It may have reasonably
understood the reversal as not refuting the court of appeals' understanding of the scope of our standards of care, but challenging instead the
court of appeals' understanding of the evidentiary relevance of ethical
regulations. In Leftoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer v. Allen,' we see
that this is true.
In its relevant part, Allen was an action brought for malpractice and
violation of trust and confidence. Ms. Allen retained the defendants to
settle the estate after her husband's untimely death." 9
During
counseling, she expressed an interest in selling her husband's lithographic business."4 Quick to respond, the defendants introduced her
to a potential buyer."" After she reached an informal agreement with
this buyer, and at the insistence of both parties, the defendants
represented the buyer and Ms. Allen at the sale.'
Unfortunately, the
buyer defaulted, and Ms. Allen brought this action against her attorneys
to recover her losses.' 4
At trial, the judge disallowed "any evidence of, reference to, or jury
instruction on [the violation of ethical regulations by the defendants.] " '" Ms. Allen appealed from this ruling, and from others not
relevant to our inquiry. Taking the message of Davis v. Findley to be
that even any evidentiary role for ethical regulations in malpractice
actions is prohibited, the court of appeals, speaking again through Judge
Blackburn, cited to Davis and let it go at that. 45 The trial judge must
have been correct, the court said, to "[exclude] all references to the Code
of Professional Responsibility."146 Ms. Allen had relied upon Cambron
v. Canal Insurance Co. 47 mistakenly, Judge Blackburn noted, because
although the supreme court approved jury instructions on ethical
regulations in that case, it involved an equitable action to set aside
default judgements collusively obtained by two parties represented by
the same attorney and did not profess to address the issue of the role of

138. 212 Ga. App. 550, 442 S.E.2d 466.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 560, 442 S.E.2d at 467.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 561, 442 S.E.2d at 467.
Id.
Id.
246 Ga. 147, 269 S.E.2d 426 (1980).
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he said,
ethical regulations in malpractice actions. 148 On this issue,
149
Davis and not Cambron is the supreme court's command.
I hope the reader will agree that the court of appeals' decision in Allen
is, in the context of the Davis reversal, understandable. I also hope the
reader will agree that it is surely wrong. Most malpractice actions are
based on some violation of the standards of practice established by the
professional community.150 This is, for example, how we know what
negligence means in a professional context. If so, then what the
profession has said about its standards of practice in its ethical
regulations is at least relevant evidence of these standards generally,
and therefore, relevant to proving malpractice. Such an analysis,
however, is really nothing more than a clearer statement of what the
court of appeals said in Davis. Allen, then, forces us back to a
reconsideration of the Davis issue by pointing out that there was more
going on than the supreme court thought. And presumably, the supreme
court has realized the necessity of reexamining Davis in Allen for it
recently granted certiorari 151 to address the following issues:
1. Under what conditions can a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility or the Standards of Conduct under Bar Rule 4-102 serve
as a legal basis for a legal malpractice claim?
2. Is a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the
admissible as relevant
Standards of Conduct under Bar Rule15 4-102
2
evidence in a legal malpractice action?
If the court had only wished to clarify the course it was already on, the
second listed issue would have been all it needed. Its willingness to

148. 212 Ga. App. at 561, 442 S.E.2d at 467.
149. Id. The court of appeals acted similarly in Coleman v. Hicks, 209 Ga. App. 467,
433 S.E.2d 621 (1993), a case decided at the very beginning of this year. But in that case
Davis was clearer precedence because the malpractice claim in Coleman was also for
overcharging. Citing Davis, the court stated: "Even if plaintiffs complaint were not time
barred, it must fail insofar as it can be construed to allege that defendants breached duties
imposed by the Code of Professional Conduct when they charged excessive fees for their
services." 209 Ga. App. 69 at 4, 433 S.E.2d at 623.
150. See RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 3-4 (1989).
The careful reader will note that some malpractice claimants separate malpractice claims
from breach of fiduciary duties and even from breach of professional regulation. See infra
notes 154-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of Tante. This is probably based on
cautious pleading practices more than it is on the ability to maintain clear distinctions
between these. Some courts, however, distinguish breach of fiduciary obligations from
malpractice. See generally MALLEN & SMITH, supra at 4. The concept of malpractice is
broad enough to encompass all three claims.
151. Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C., No. A94A0660, 1994 Ga. LEXIS
697 (Ga. May 9, 1994).
152. Id.
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address the first issue, however, tells us that the court understands
there is more going on here. To understand the full extent of what the
court will face in its consideration of Allen, and reconsideration of Davis,
we need to review one additional recent court of appeals decision in this
153 and it is yet another case
area. The case is Tante v. Herring
pending before the supreme court on certiorari.'5 4
Tante is a sad case for our profession. The Herrings, a husband and
wife, sued their attorney, Tante, for legal malpractice, breach of
fiduciary duty, and breach of contract."" According to the court, both
Herrings retained Tante to pursue a Social Security disability claim for
Ms. Herring." The trial court granted summary judgment on liability
for the Herrings finding that Tante, during the representation, took
advantage of confidential information about Ms. Herring and her
impaired state to gain an adulterous sexual relationship with her. 57
His conduct caused physical and mental harm to Ms. Herring and
infected both Herrings with two strains of venereal disease.1 5
The Herrings' attorney used a shotgun approach to the filing, alleging
as many legal bases for the claim as he could find. Tante attempted to
respond to them all. As for the malpractice claim, Tante said that "he
could not be liable for malpractice as a matter of law because he
performed in a manner consistent with the standard of care ordinarily
exercised by lawyers generally under similar conditions and like

153. 211 Ga. App. 322, 439 S.E.2d 5 (1993).
154. The supreme court issued its opinion in this certified appeal on October 31, 1994.
See Tante v. Herring, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 866 (Oct. 31, 1994). The opinion is discussed at
infra note 184.
155. 211 Ga. App. at 323, 439 S.E.2d at 7.
156. Id. at 323-24, 439 S.E.2d at 7-8. The malpractice action was brought by both
Herrings. In order for Mr. Herring to pursue a malpractice claim for damages he suffered
because of Tante's professional misconduct, Mr. Herring had to show first that he was in
a client-lawyer relationship with Tante. Tante denied representation of Mr. Herring,
asserting that he only represented Ms. Herring, but the court found that the contract and
the conduct of the parties created a representation of Mr. Herring as well as Ms. Herring
even though Mr. Tante only pursued Ms. Herring's claim.
157. Id. at 324-26, 439 S.E.2d at 7-9. Tante's professional advice to Ms.Herring was
what she really needed was a sexual relationship with him. Id. at 326, 439 S.E.2d at 9.
My guess is that Tante would defend this by saying that it was not professional advice, but
a casual opinion about her mental state unrelated to his practice of law. If so, then the
court was quite right, as discussed below, infra note 184 and accompanying text, to
complain that Tante's understanding of the practice was too narrow. We do not represent
legal claims; we represent real people. To separate these as Mr. Tante would have us do
is to corrupt the ethics that define our profession. For further discussion see, Jack L.
Sammons, Rebellious Ethics andAlbert Speer, in AGAINST THE GRAIN: NEW APPROACHES
TO PROFESSIONAL ETHics, (M. Goldberg, ed., 1993). (Trinity: Valley Forge, Pa. 1993).
158. 211 Ga. App. at 323, 439 S.E.2d at 7.
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circumstances, and he was successfuL" 6 9 Making explicit what was
only implicit in the court of appeal's thinking in Davis,"o Judge
Birdsong said: "In our view.., this argument takes a too narrow view
of attorneys' obligations to their clients. A successful monetary result on
a claim does not mean that a lawyer cannot, per se, otherwise breach his
professional responsibilities to his client."1"'
Lawyers, the court said, "... must exercise the degree of skill,
prudence, and diligence which ordinary members of the ... profession

commonly possess and exercise."162 To emphasize that they were not
talking about technical proficiency in handling a client's legal affairs, the
court added: "Tante was bound to the highest honor and integrity, to the
utmost good faith'... in the representation of the Herrings.

.

.'" citing

for this lofty language to the 1849 case of Cox v. Sullivan.63 If
lawyers are honor bound to "prudence" in their representation of the
interests of their clients, the court continued, then Tante's conduct here,
conduct that included use of confidential information adverse to the
client's personal interests, was clearly professional misconduct meriting
malpractice."' In other words, you cannot defend against legal
malpractice, by claiming to have successfully represented clients if by
the very manner of your representation you caused them egregious
harm. This is true even if your pursuit of their legal claim was
successful and even if you served well their financial interests or
otherwise obtained their legal objectives. Furthermore, the court went
on, Tante's sexual misconduct with his client was potentially damaging
to the Social Security claim and constituted the crime of adultery. 5
Tante's defense against the breach of fiduciary duty is not reported in
the opinion, but the court's response is, and it is much the same as its
response to his malpractice defense (as one would expect given the
difficulty of distinguishing the two claims.) Tante, the court maintained,

159. Id. at 324, 439 S.E.2d at 8.
160. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
161. 211 Ga. App. at 324, 439 S.E.2d at 8. See discussion of the narrower view at infra
note 184.
162. 211 Ga. App. at 325, 439 S.E.2d at 8.
163. Id. at 326, 439 S.E.2d at 9. This was a bad choice. In Cox, the court did use the
language quoted, but it did so in the context of permitting an attorney to apply funds
obtained from a common debtor to his own account rather than to the client's. Cox v.
Sullivan, 7 Ga. 144, 147 (1849).
164. 211 Ga. App. at 326-27, 439 S.E.2d at 10.
165. Id. at 325-26, 439 S.E.2d at 9. Under State Bar of Georgia Standard of Conduct
No. 3 a lawyer shall not engage in.illegal professional conduct involving moral turpitude.
Interestingly, Tante could be read broadly to mean that a sexual relationship with a

married client is a disbarable offense.
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occupied a position-of trust and confidence, and abused it to promote his
own sexual interests to the injury of the Herrings.'"
Finally, the court of appeals responded to Tante's objections to the
Herrings' expert witnesses' references to violations of ethical regulations.167 Unlike the decision it was soon to render in Allen, the court
did not interpret Davis to prohibit all reference to ethical regulations.
Instead, noting that the supreme court has "foreclosed a claim of legal
malpractice based upon [violations of ethical regulations]",' the court
returned to its pre-Davisview:
...

[Clonduct which violates the Code of Professional Responsibility

may, in appropriate circumstances, also provide a basis for claim[s] for
legal malpractice. The correct statement of law from the cases Tante
relies upon is that "standing alone" a violation of a bar standards [sic]
will not support a legal malpractice claim ....

[Here], Tante's

conduct, when measured against the standards stated in the affidavits
of the Herrings' expert, was sufficient to state a claim of legal
malpractice. 69
From the landscape of Davis,Allen, and Tante we can now see the full
extent of what the supreme court faces as it reexamines more closely our
general rule that violations of ethical regulations, standing alone, cannot
be the basis for a malpractice action. Because this is complex, surely it
must be tempting to the court to see these cases as nothing more than
a circuitous side-trip from our "general rule." It must be tempting, that
is, to announce that the "standing alone" limitation on basing malpractice actions on violations of ethical regulations is only an obscure
reference to the obvious need to prove the other elements of malpractice.
This is, as I have noted above, -the reading of the law that is most
consistent with earlier cases, 70 and it is a reading that not only
permits a reconciliation of our general rule with Davis, but even offers
a good solution for Allen. Davis becomes understandable because in
Davis.7 there are damages only if there is overcharging. In other
words, the only harm done to the client is the specific harm proscribed
by the ethical regulation. There are no consequential harms. The court
then, could distinguish Davis and return the general rule by declaring
that overcharging cannot be the basis for malpractice. (Thus making
more relevant the supreme court's reminder to the parties in Davis that

166. 211 Ga. at 327, 439 S.E.2d at 10.
167. Id. at 328, 439 S.E.2d at 10-11.

168. Id., 439 S.E.2d at 10.
169. Id., 439 S.E.2d at 11.
170. See supra note 125.
171. Davis v. Findley, 262 Ga. 612, 422 S.E.2d 859 (1992).
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bar-sponsored fee arbitration was an available rememdy).172 The only
reason for ever thinking otherwise about overcharging is that overcharging is also a violation of ethical regulations, but this standing alone, the
court could say, would not convert a fee dispute into a malpractice claim
and this was all we meant in Davis. The court of appeals was simply
wrong, the court would add, when it found that the elements of legal
malpractice had been met in Davis.
Relying on the elements analysis approach would simplify Allen
because Davis would now be distinguished. When the basis for
malpractice is truly in torts or contracts," the court could say, there
is nothing wrong with proving violations of ethical regulations as a way
of establishing both the duty and the breach if there is consequential
harm to the client proximately caused by the violation, harm, that is,
other than the violation itself.
Hidden behind this straightforward return to our general rule,
however, is a new implication that should at least give the supreme
court pause. If I have our general rule correct, all violations of ethical
regulations have always had the potential for providing a basis for
malpractice if damage and causation could be shown. Davis was the
only real challenge to this and, as we can now see, Davis can be
reconciled with our general rule. In the past however, we lacked the
imagination to see how much this general rule implied. Now, however,
with cases like Davis, Allen, and Tante for encouragement, we are not
likely to be so restrained. For example, suppose that a court disqualifies
a lawyer from representation for a recently discovered conflict of
interests. (Usually, a court's understanding of whether a conflict of
interests exists is based upon the ethical regulations of the profession.
We will not be stretching at all to say that our hypothetical disqualification also shows a violation of an ethical regulation). Now, in almost all
cases, clients are badly damaged by disqualifications. The case becomes
markedly more expensive, for one thing; time is lost, for another;
recovery may be postponed, and there could indeed be compensable
physical or emotional harm. But if all this is true, and if our general
rule is also correct, then the client of a disqualified lawyer should have
172. See supra note 136.
173. Georgia courts have long held that malpractice claims can sound in contracts
(because they treat agency as a contract claim) or that they can sound in torts. Different
rules have been applied depending on which is correct for a particular claim. See, e.g.,
Coleman v. Hicks, 209 Ga. App. 467, 433 S.E.2d 621 (1993). But contracts makes sense
as a theoretical basis for malpractice only because the contract between the client and the
lawyer includes an implied term to exercise ordinary professional skill and knowledge in
the representation. Thus, there would seem to be no difference between torts and contracts

relevant to the issue of whether ethical regulations can provide a basis for malpractice.

334

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

a prima facie malpractice claim against her attorney.17 4 Note well the
implication of this! Rather than being tempted to stretch conflict of
interests rules to increase profitable representations, economicallyminded lawyers who realize that the financial risk of disqualification has
been shifted to them may instead become zealous in their compliance.
Now as this example shows, this could be something the supreme
court wishes for our profession. Almost every ethical regulation175
would be backed by the potential legal sanction of malpractice. This
would include not only rules that are not designed primarily for the
protection of clients, but also those designed for the protection of the
adversarial system or the public because it is often possible to show
some damage to clients from almost any rule violation. For example, in
some jurisdictions lawyers are ethically obligated to reveal a client's
intention to commit a serious crime.17 In these jurisdiction, lawyers
are at risk of being sued by those harmed by their clients if the lawyer
knew of the client's intention and took no action to prevent it. Under
our general rule however, in these jurisdictions the client, in theory at
least, could also sue the attorney in malpractice for failing to reveal
sufficient information to prevent her from committing the crime!
Time, space limitations, and editorial tolerance do not allow me to go
on with examples, but many could be given, and the implication of each
is that the enforcement of ethical regulations through legal malpractice
could have an enormous impact on the practice. Without attempting the
extremely difficult task of assessing the quality of this impact, one would
think that the extent of it alone would be enough to give the supreme
court pause before adopting a straightforward return to our general rule.
What is now facing the supreme court is even more daunting than this
however, because we have yet to consider what the court would do with
Tante if the court returned to our general rule. When we consider this,
we see our theme returning once again.
Tante expands our "general rule" because its malpractice concern is
not with specific ethical regulations. Like AFLAC, it is concerned with
general ethical obligations imposed upon all attorneys as professional
standards. Despite the impression one might get from Davis and Allen,
most malpractice actions are not concerned with violations of ethical
regulations. This is probably true because most malpractice actions are

174. This should be unsurprising since malpractice may be based on harm produced
by a conflict of interests determined by a violation of ethical regulations in Georgia. See,
e.g., Peters v. Hyatt Legal Serve., 211 Ga. App. 587, 440 S.E.2d 222 (1993). In the text I
am only extending this to the damage done by disqualification.
175. See supra note 126, at 75.
176. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. Bar Rule 4-1.6(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1994).
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based on negligence in the handling of a client's legal case. The ethical
regulations dealing with competency, diligence, and so forth, especially
those in Georgia, are simply not helpful in malpractice cases and there
is no good reason for a plaintiff to refer to them. Often these regulations
demand less than the law requires. 77 Instead of being based on
ethical regulations, most malpractice cases are based upon the ordinary
performance standards of our profession. Courts typically describe these
performance standards using something like the litany of "skills,
prudence, and diligence" found in the Tante opinion, 78 although these
litanies often vary. Before Tante, and before its predecessor on this
subject, the court of appeals decision in Davis,79 most would have
assumed that these litanies were to be narrowly construed to include
only the performance of "technical" duties such as the timely filing of a
claim er an appeal, due diligence in searching out and interviewing
witnesses, thorough exploration of legal precedence, and so forth, in the
handling of the client's legal affairs. On this reading, malpractice claims
based upon these ordinary performance standards of the profession were
severely limited.
Tante calls all this into question. By describing this understanding
of the ordinary performance standards as "too narrow,"' the court of
appeals announces that it will include within these ordinary performance standards the far broader ethical obligations of the practice. The
performance standards that provide bases for malpractice, the court is
saying, are not just about "technical" duties; they are not just about the
handling of a client's legal affairs, but they are also about the way the
client is treated in the process. Tante is telling us here that we need a
truer description of our profession, a broader understanding of the
service lawyers perform for their clients. Lawyers are not simply
technicians in the pursuit of a maximum recovery on legal claims; we
should not measure their success only by the outcome of their cases.
Lawyers are trusted problem solvers with obligations to clients that are
"professional" precisely because these obligations reflect this broader
function.
Now in a case involving sexual misconduct with clients, we should not
ordinarily take too seriously what any appellate court says-any court
will find a way of punishing the conduct even at the expense of
consistency with prior case law. Given the "professionalism" climate in

177.

See, e.g., the "abandonment" standard of competence in Georgia. GA. RULES OF

CT. ANN., Bar Rule 4-102, Standard 44 (1994).
178. 211 Ga. App. at 324, 439 S.E.2d at 8.
179.

Findley v. Davis, 202 Ga. App. 332, 414 S.E.2d 317 (1991).

180. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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Georgia however (and given Tante's consistency with the court of
appeals' decision in Davis), I think we should take the court of appeals'
claim about broader obligations seriously regardless of the questionable
context in which it appears. 8 '
Taken seriously, what the court of appeals says in Tante sounds
virtuous, and worth applauding, but the court is certainly not getting
this broad description of the practice from any decisions within the
judicial function. This description is instead coming straight from the
regulatory function. Such an understanding of the practice is, for
example, the understanding that lies behind all of the supreme court's
proud talk of higher standards in AFLAC and, as we shall see later, in
Green v. Green.8 2 But now, viewed from Tante's conception of what
can constitute malpractice, permitting ethical regulatory violations to be
the basis for malpractice actions if all elements are proven, as a return
to our general rule would do, no longer seems to be an expansion in
potential liability for lawyers, but rather a limitation!"s '
Tante then, may be best understood as an attempt to combine a
regulatory understanding of the practice with enforcement of that
understanding through the malpractice law of the judicial function.
Such an ascendancy of the hierarchy of the regulatory function must
surely be an intimidating prospect for the court.. Accepting the
implications of Tante would be a bold and, perhaps, desperate move of
regulation. Are we at that point? Some argue that we are. Yet, even
if the supreme court determines we are not, surely it must see that
Tante's description of the practice is much truer to what the supreme
court itself has said when acting in its regulatory function. It will be

181. See infra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
182. 263 Ga. 551, 437 S.E.2d 457 (1993).
183. For example, it is conventional to describe good lawyering as including a
willingness to tell clients when they are being fools or, what is worse, immoral fools; it is
also considered good lawyering to advise clients that a case is probably not worth pursuing
in the long run. Suppose that a client comes to a lawyer with a perfectly valid claim, but
one that a person of good prudence would not pursue. Suppose that this same lawyer takes

the case without hesitation and does what the client wants. Later the client understands
that he has made a mistake-an expensive one at that with loss of time, business, money,
and so forth. Under the broad view, the client would not need to cite to any ethical
regulatory violations (at most he could only find aspirational statements regarding good

counseling), but could claim that the performance standards of conduct of our profession
were violated by the lawyer's failure to counsel him about his own stupidity and he was
damaged as a result. If instead malpractice had to be based either on narrowly understood
performance standards or on ethical regulatory violations, no action would lie!
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Tante
difficult for the supreme court either to reject Tante or to accept
1
without facing the struggle between its competing functions.' 4
184. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Hunt, issued its opinion in the
certified appeal on October 31, 1994. Although the court announced that it was affirming
in part and reversing in part, the effect of the opinion is to affirm the results of the court
of appeals decision in Tante thus permitting the plaintiff to maintain a damage action
against the attorney. The Supreme Court thought the court of appeals had erred in
affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment on Tante's claim for legal
malpractice because: "It is axiomatic that the element of breach of duty in a legal
malpractice case--the failure to exercise ordinary care, skill, and diligence--must relate
directly to the duty of the attorney, that is, the duty to perform the task for which he was
employed." Finding that Tante's conduct had no effect on his performance of legal services
because he had obtained the Social Security benefits for the Herrings, the court said that
....
a satisfactory result under an agreement for legal services by necessity precludes a
claim for legal malpractice." However, the court went on, that the Herrings may pursue
their claim for breach of fiduciary duty because it is ". . . based on Tante's alleged misuse,
obtained ... in ... (the]
to his own advantage, of confidentiality information ...
representation."
This is an odd opinion. Usually, I believe, the term "legal malpractice" is understood to
include claims based on either negligent professional performance or a breach of fiduciary
duties or both. MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 4 (3d ed. 1989). Some courts

distinguish standard of care duty violations from standard of conduct duty violations, but
both are considered legal malpractice. Id. Even if a distinction between legal malpractice
and breach of fiduciary duties of an attorney is maintained, as it sometimes may be, most
authorities agree that the distinction makes very little difference. See id. at 402 and
HORAN & SPELLMIRE, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: PREVENTION AND DEFENSE 16-1 (1985).
With very little research effort one can find equally strong statements of what is axiomatic
to legal malpractice that are in direct opposition to Justice Hunt's observations about the
harm done here. "The most obvious kind of malpractice is an intentional and unprofessional act that injures the client." KINDREGAN, MALPRACTICE AND THE LAWYER 3 (revd. ed.
1981). Perhaps this is so because Justice Hunt's axiom is question begging. What the task
is that the lawyer is hired to perform is the issue. Justice Hunt would describe that task
narrowly as obtaining good financial results on a particular claim while others would insist
that the two essential tasks of good lawyering are counseling and the maintenance of the
relationships upon which good counseling must be based.
But we really do not need to pursue this question. The far more important one is what
difference Justice Hunt's distinction of a violation of a standard of conduct or breach of
fiduciary duties from a violation of a standard of care or legal malpractice makes other
than the one he noted, that is, that one requires an expert's affidavit since it is described
as legal malpractice while the other does not.
What Justice Hunt has done is what I said in the text would be difficult to do. He has
avoided facing squarely the struggle between the court's competing functions. The way he
avoids this is by shifting the inquiry from the court of appeals concern with the regulatory
function back to the judicial function. But now, however, the judicial function's inquiry will
be on whether or not the lawyer has breached a fiduciary obligation. This permits him to
avoid discussing the regulatory function because breach of fiduciary obligations is a rather
untapped legal source of regulation of the profession. Often, the law of fiduciaries would
demand more of lawyers than even our professional codes would. For example, the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct permit the lawyer to use confidential information to
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Before going on with two relatively minor legal malpractice cases, I
hope the reader now understands why I described this pervasive struggle
between the competing judicial and regulatory functions of the appellate
courts as this year's dominant event in this area of law. I fear however,
that I have belabored the point. Perhaps I can now get by in the rest of
the survey with just a brief mention of connections to our theme because
my hope is that you are now going to see this struggle everywhere.
B.

Real Estate Closing/Client-LawyerRelationship

Almost all of the judicial talk about ethical norms applicable only to
lawyers is dependent upon first finding a client-lawyer relationship.
Georgia case law on when a client-lawyer relationship is formed has
moved slowly in the direction of the test of a putative client's subjective,
but reasonable, belief that the relationship exists.'
The movement
to this test has been slow, although the test is a common one in other
jurisdictions, because Georgia courts have been rigid about form and
formalities while insisting that they are not.'" The most troubling
area involving the client-lawyer relationship issue has been malpractice
in real estate closings."' 7 We were not spared from this troubling area
this year.
m plaintiffs selected defendant from a list of
In Richard v. David,"
approved lawyers provided by the lending bank."s9 The bank notified
defendant of their selection. At the end of the closing, the realtor asked
for the required termite letter; the seller passed the letter to defendant;

his own advantage without a client's consent if the use is not disadvantageous to the client.

Fiduciary law permits no such thing. Because plaintiffs have not tapped out fiduciary law,
Justice Hunt can postpone the face off between the competing functions--at least he can in
this case.
185. J.L. Sammons, Conflict of Interest: Identifying the Relationship, Recent
Developments In Ethics, The Institute Of Continuing Legal Education In Georgia (Feb. 10,
1989). The starting point of the relationship varies depending upon the nature of the
putative client's claim, e.g., malpractice, conflict ofinterests, confidentiality. If the question
is whether a conversation with an attorney is sufficient to form a client-lawyer relationship
for the purposes of the privilege, the Georgia test seems to be whether the putative client
subjectively and reasonably believed that the conversation was in contemplation of

employment of the attorney. Id. at 65.
186. Id. at 66. This is an important area for malpractice. During 1983-85, 50%of all

reported malpractice cases arose out of real estate and personal injury matters. Will H.
Gates & Sheree L. Swetin, Characteristicsof Legal Malpractice:Report of the National
Legal MalpracticeData Center (1989) as cited in GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL, THE

LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 175 (2d ed. 1994).
187. Sobelson, supra note 130, at 307-11.

188. 212 Ga. App. 661, 442 S.E.2d 459 (1994).
189. Id. at 661, 442 S.E.2d at 460.
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In all this
defendant reviewed it, and passed it to the plaintiffs."l
passing around no one noticed, or at least, no one commented upon, the
serious past pest infestations clearly shown by the letter. As you have
already guessed, six months later the plaintiffs discovered extensive
structural damage."9 ' Upset with "their" lawyer, they filed a malpractice action alleging negligence in failing to advise them of the significance of the findings in the letter.
The court of appeals announced its test for determining if a clientlawyer relationship existed in Legacy Homes, Inc. v. Cole.'" "The
basic question [regarding] the formation of the attorney-client relationship is whether it has been sufficiently established that advice or
assistance of the attorney is both sought and received in matters
pertinent to [the] profession." 93 Legacy Homes was a 1992 case that
in turn quoted Guillebeau v. Jenkins,"9 yet another real estate closing
case, for the same language. The quoted portion of Guillebeau came
from In re Dowdy,'95 an earlier disciplinary case. (Professor Sobelson
reviewed this line of cases in last year's survey, providing excellent
analysis, and I will refrain from adding my own thoughts).'"
Applying this "advice or assistance" test in a typically rigid fashion,' 9 the court found that the plaintiffs "never sought any legal
advice from defendant and defendant never offered any legal advice to
plaintiff. Nor did plaintiff ever communicate to defendant that they
would rely on her for legal advice at the closing."' 8 And then, turning
to the truer test and a better reading of Guillebeau,"' the court said:

190.

Id.

191. Id.
192.

205 Ga. App. 34, 35, 421 S.E.2d 127, 128 (1992).

193. Id. There are cases permitting a malpractice claim in the absence of client-lawyer
relationship. Those cases are based on third party liability to those affected by a
representation or on "gratuitous agency theory." They were distinguished in Legacy Homes
as discussed in Sobelson, supra note 130, at 307-08.
194. 182 Ga. App. 225, 355 S.E.2d 453 (1987).
195. 247 Ga. 488, 277 S.E.2d 36 (1981).
196. See Sobelson, supranote 130, at 307-11. As I noted in a previous survey: "'The use
of the quote [in a case denying the creation of a client-lawyer relationship] is ironic because
Guillebeau'sadoption of the quote from Dowdy seemed to be a significant liberalization of
prior case law governing malpractice claims by putative clients and is sufficiently out of
line with other cases and with the holding in Guillebeauto make one wonder if the quote
should be taken seriously at all." Jack L. Sammons, Legal Ethics, 41 MERCER L. REv. 237,
284 (1989). The continued use of Guillebeauis the strongest evidence we have that the law
in this area is moving towards a "subjective, but reasonable" test for determining when the
relationship is formed. See also Sammons, supra note 184.
197. See Sobelson, supra note 130, at 310.
198. 212 Ga. App. at 662, 442 S.E.2d at 460.
199. See Sammons, supra note 184.
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"We conclude that plaintiffs could not have had a reasonable belief that
an attorney-client relationship existed with defendant."
This is interesting for two reasons: First, the seeking "advice or
assistance" test applied in Legacy Homes, and quoted with approval
here, now seems reduced to one method by which the court will
determine whether or not the putative client's subjective belief in the
existence of a client-lawyer relationship is reasonable. Second, this
combination of the Legacy Homes test and the "subjective, but reasonable" 'test could not possibly produce the results the court said it did
here. The reason plaintiffs never sought legal advice, nor communicated
to defendant that they would expect it was, quite obviously, because they
already assumed that defendant was acting as their lawyer! They
selected the lawyer, paid for the lawyer, and absent anyone telling them
in certain terms that they were not being represented, they should have
assumed they were.
This was a routine closing. The only parties at the closing were the
seller, the purchaser, and a lawyer paid for and selected by the
purchaser. An appellate court willing to place itself in this specific
context to determine reasonableness would have little choice but to find
the Richards' subjective belief in their representation reasonable. The
court in Richard,however, did not use this as its context for determining
reasonableness. It could not have and held as it did. Instead, it must
have looked at closings from within the context of the law, that is, as
members of the legal community would, fully aware before* any
determination of reasonableness is made that as a. matter of law,
practice, and custom the lawyer represents the lending institution.
Surely, in thinking through the reasonableness issue, the court
unconsciously imagined the closing as an attorney would, rather than as
a putative lay client.
Of course, the attorney's perspective should not be the one used to
determine reasonableness here. Furthermore, even within this limited
professional context we may find a legal community that -is itself
sufficiently confused about whom the lawyer represents to make
reasonable a wide array of subjective beliefs in representation. For
example, as Professor Sobelson ably demonstrated in last year's survey,
the logical conclusion of the court's analysis in Legacy Homes is that the
lawyer involved in the closing in that case represented no one!20 Look
also at FAO 86-5 concerning the "ethical propriety of lawyers delegating
to nonlawyers the closing of real estate transactions." 2D One reason,
200.
201.
202.

212 Ga. App. at 662, 442 S.E.2d at 460.
Sobelson, supra note 130, at 309.
Formal Op. 86-5 (1989).
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according to this FAO, that closings cannot be delegated to nonlawyers
is that the lawyer may be called upon to give advice at the closing. But
to whom? Most routine closings do not include the lawyer's client, the
lending institution. Does this mean that the fear of improper advicegiving is absent in routine closings; if so, why was the opinion so rigid
about requiring attorney participation in all closings?
The truth of the matter is that we as a profession have done a terrible
job of educating the public about the lawyer's role in closings. Far too
often, when a price is to be paid for this confusion, the price is selfprotectively thrust upon the public as it was in Richards. 3
This year gave us yet another real estate closing malpractice case
displaying more of this self-protection. In Williams v. Fortson, Bentley
& Griffin,' the court of appeals affirmed a grant of summary judgment finding that the closing attorney did not commit malpractice
leading plaintiffs to purchase a home substantially damaged by termites
because no client-lawyer relationship existed between the parties.' 5
About halfway through the closing, plaintiffs signed a disclaimer of
representation and a release and covenant not to sue.2o' The disclaimer explained that legal services at the closing were on behalf of the
07
lender."
The borrowers were also encouraged to retain separate
counsel to protect their legal interests.0 8
Now if this were all there was to it, no one would find that plaintiffs,
in the face of this clear disclaimer, could have formed a reasonable
subjective belief that the lender's lawyer represented them. And, if this
were so, there would be no tension here, no reason to question the
enforceability of the disclaimer.2' But this is not all there was to it.
The closing attorney, according to plaintiffs' affidavits, 1 0 told the
plaintiffs during closing that she was their attorney and would take care
of them; she advised that the termite report presented at the closing was
unacceptable; accepted a revised termite report submitted after closing

203. 212 Ga. App. 661, 442 S.E.2d 459 (1994).
204. 212 Ga. App. 222, 441 S.E.2d 686 (1994).
205. Id. at 223, 441 S.E.2d at 687.

206. Id.
207. Id. at 222, 441 S.E.2d at 687.

208. Id.
209. This is true even without consideration of the rigidity of Georgia's enforcement of
disclaimers in these situations. See Carmichael v. Barham, Bennett, Miller & Stone, 187
Ga. App. 494,370 S.E.2d 639 (1988) and Moore v. Harris, 188 Ga. App. 251,372 S.E.2d 654
(1988). There would normally be little reason to doubt the effectiveness of a disclaimer in
Georgia.
210. This was in the procedural context of a motion for summary judgment. The court
must have felt that any disagreement over these facts was unimportant.
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(it, too, was inadequate) without consulting with plaintiffs as if she were
acting as their attorney, and, during the closing, advised plaintiffs that
211
they need not read everything presented for signatures.
Some of these actions are consistent with the attorney's sole representation of the lender-refusing the termite report, for example--but some
are not. The defendant may have been as confused about whom she
represented as the plaintiffs were because of her willingness to act for
the plaintiffs by accepting the termite letter without consulting
them;212 her giving them the bad legal advice that they need not read
everything presented for signatures; and the alleged announcement, that
she was acting as their representative. 1
Should a disclaimer of
representation be effective if it is effectively discredited by the conduct
and speech of the one seeking the advantage of the disclaimer? One
would think this would be an interesting question at least, but the court
rejected this substantive inquiry entirely, so anxious were they to permit
the lawyer to protect herself against her own poor judgment through a
written disclaimer.
Plaintiffs argued further that the attorney's willingness to act for them
by ensuring that seller delivered an acceptable report was an assumption of a voluntary or gratuitous agency status. 214 The court rejected
this because the reliance required for voluntary agency status must be
justifiable. It could not be justifiable here, the court found, because of
the disclaimer.21
Of course, this disclaimer was a disclaimer of
representation, that is, a disclaimer of a client-lawyer relationship
between the lender's lawyer and the buyer. It was not a disclaimer of
a voluntarily assumed agency status.1 ' In the primary authority on

211. 212 Ga. App. at 222-23, 441 S.E.2d at 687.
212. We do not know the rest of the story here since this was an appeal from a grant
of summary judgment, but one would think that she jeopardized the closing by not having
the purchasers assent to the revised termite letter. Surely the courts will not permit her
to have it both ways, that is, not to be responsible for representation of the plaintiffs and
yet capable of binding them as if she were their representative.
213. Richard v. David, 212 Ga. App. 661, 442 S.E.2d 459, 460.
214. Id at 662, 442 S.E.2d at 460. Not enough facts were given in the case to make
this clear. The attorney could have been acting appropriately for the lender and in a
manner consistent with her sole representation of the lender in assuming the duty to
review a subsequently submitted termite letter. But if so and as noted in the previous
footnote, her actions should not have been binding on the purchaser. On the other hand,
if she led the purchaser to reasonably believe that she would be acting on their behalf in

reviewing the subsequently submitted letter, then this would appear to be a classic case
of voluntary agency.
215. 212 Ga. App. at 224, 441 S.E.2d at 688.
216.

149 Ga. App. 478, 254 S.E.2d 716 (1979).
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this issue, Simmerson v. Blanks, 217 the court found the existence of a
voluntary agency after finding that there was no client-lawyer relationship. Surely a disclaimer of the latter should not be considered a
disclaimer of the former as the court seemed to believe or at least not in
all circumstances. The disclaimer should be nothing more than
circumstantial evidence on the issues of whether a voluntary agency was
assumed and whether reliance was justifiable.
Finally, suppose the court of appeals analysis is correct. In that case,
the attorney here has acted in violation of Standard 48218 prohibiting
the giving of advice to unrepresented parties with interests in conflict
with the attorney's client. 219 The court does not notice that its opinion
here creates this violation because it did not take this regulatory
standard seriously. If instead the court had taken this regulation as
seriously here as other ethical norms were taken in AFLAC or in Tante,
we would have expected the court to say that attorneys are liable for
advice given in violation of the standard if reliance on the advice were
reasonable.
Williams then, just continues our problems in this area. Solutions
however, do not lie in rigid enforcement of ethical regulations although
I may have implied this.' 0 Nor do they lie, as I also implied above, in
better education of putative clients and the public concerning the
attorney's role at closings. They may not lie even in good lawyers who
are more careful about their limited role. Solutions lie instead, in
accepting what is behind our current confusion. We are trying to impose
a model of individual advocacy upon a situation crying out for something
different. In closings the good attorney should act, in Justice Brandeis'
term, as a "counselor to the situation" responsible to all for the success
of the transaction, but zealously representing the individual interests of
no one. Both hierarchies of governing norms, however, are based upon
a model of zealous advocacy for individuals and thus both prevent us
from seeing this other possibility.

217. Id. at 479, 254 S.E.2d at 718.
218. GA. RULES OF CT. ANN., Bar Rule 4-102, Standard 48 (1994).
219. Id.
220. One reason the solution does not lie here is that rigid enforcement of conflict of
interests rules here would increase transaction costs prohibitively.
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IV. BADPRACTICES
A. Notice to Opposing Parties
I One problem with the appellate court's treatment of malpractice issues
in real estate closings is that the appellate courts seem to permit
lawyers to take the full measure of all legal advantages to avoid liability
regardless of the ethics of doing so. This is far from the rhetoric of
AFLAC and even further from the bold language of Tante. Unlike what
we have seen in these other areas, there is no hint of an ethical
regulatory concern in these real estate closing cases.
21
Two years ago, in a concurring opinion in Evanoff v. Evanof
Justice Benham announced his personal concerns with lawyers who take
the full measure of all legal advantages. 222 He returned to this theme
again this year in the case of Green v. Green,' an adequate notice
case very similar to Evanoff but with different results. Justice Benham's
concerns in these cases however, were not with the legal advantages
lawyers take for their own self-protection, as in the real estate closing
cases, nor with using the full measure of the law to obtain financial

221. 262 Ga. 303, 304, 418 S.E.2d 62, 63 (1992) (Benham, J., concurring).
222. Id. at 305, 418 S.E.2d at 63.
223. 263 Ga. 551, 437 S.E.2d 457 (1993). He also used this theme in a concurring
opinion in King v. State, 262 Ga. 477,421 S.E.2d 708 (1992). In King Justice Benham was
concerned with the professionalism of police officers appearing as witnesses for the
prosecution. In the first appearance of the case, King v. State, 261 Ga. 534, 407 S.E.2d
733 (1991), a police officer had disregarded the court's instruction to avoid specifics in
referring to the defendant's character. This contemptuous conduct resulted in a reversal.
On retrial, this same officer, "a veteran of over seventeen years of services, after having
been made aware of the reason for the first reversal . . ., after having been counseled by
... the district attorney's staff ... and after having been advised in open court ... not to
give testimony as to certain matters," (262 Ga. at 479, 421 S.E.2d at 709) made an
unsolicited reference to appellants "past history." Justice Benham stated: "Tihe reference
gave the appearance of a deliberate effort to prejudice [the defendant]." 262 Ga. at 478,
421 S.E.2d at 709 (Benham, J., concurring).
Referring to the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, Justice Benham chided
the officer for acting unprofessionally and violating the spirit of the court's order, if not its
letter. The goal of improving our courts cannot be achieved, the Justice went on, "if
participants in court proceedings go all the way to the line of permissible conduct without
crossing it. They must be willing to walk wide of error and impropriety and seek to abide
by the letter and the spirit of the law." Id. at 479, 421 S.E.2d at 709. See also Bell v.
State, 263 Ga. 776, 439 S.E.2d 480 (1994) in which the court stated that "adherence to the
limitation on the latitude of oral argument is also integral to legal professionalism" in
reversing judgment. Id. at 778, 439 S.E.2d at 481. The prosecutor exceeded limits on
closing argument by "inject[ing] into the argument of extrinsic and prejudicial matters
which have no basis in the evidence." Id. at 777, 439 S.E.2d at 481.
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advantages over clients as in AFLAC-although his concerns may
eventually reach these areas as well. His announced concerns were with
the harm that lawyers do to noncients and to the adversarial system by
Justice
their overly zealous pursuit of clients' legal interests.'
Benham calls issues of this ilk "professionalism" issues," but to avoid
the confusion that seems to be inevitable in that term, I'have described
them as "badpractices."
"Badpractices" is one area in which the hierarchy of governing norms
of the regulatory function, led by Justice Benham, is rapidly gaining
ascendancy and, as Justice Sears-Collins noted in her concurring opinion
in Green v. Green, threatens the judicial function as it does so.'
Green v. Green was an appeal from the denial of a motion to set aside a
judgment in a divorce case. 2 7 The issue was the adequacy of notice
to the appellant. After appellant filed her divorce action, she moved to
Ohio. Her attorney withdrew, following the appropriate procedure of
notifying the court and giving opposing counsel his client's new
address." Later, when the case was calendared, the clerk published
notice of the trial date in the local paper as required. No one however,
made any effort to give actual notice to the appellant.' With the case
fifteenth on the calendar and assigned to an "on call" status, appellee
and his counsel appeared and announced ready on the published
date.' 3 Apparently anxious to proceed, appellee's counsel searched in
the desk drawer of the previously assigned judge to find a missing record
that threatened the case's postponement. 1 When the missing record
was found, the case was heard in appellant's absence and a judgment
was entered granting child custody to the appellee and ordering child
support from the appellant. 2
The trial court, in denying appellant's motion to set aside, found the
publication notice adequate. 3 The trial judge also found that appellant had not complied with Uniform Superior Court Rule ("USCR")
8.4234 requiring parties to actions beyond the first ten scheduled for a
trial date to be ready for trial or to obtain permission to await the call

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

263 Ga. at 554, 437 S.E.2d at 459.
Id. at 553, 437 S.E.2d at 459.
263 Ga. at 560, 437 S.E.2d 463 (Sears-Collins, J., concurring).
263 Ga. at 551, 437 S.E.2d at 457.
Id., 437 S.E.2d at 457-58.
Id. at 551-52, 437 S.E.2d at 457-58.
Id. at 551, 437 S.E.2d at 458.
Id. at 552, 437 S.E.2d at 458.
Id.
Id.
GA. RuLEs OF CT. ANN., Uniform Superior Court Rule 8.4 (1994).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

346

[Vol. 46

of the calendar clerk. 2ss The supreme court granted appellants
application for a constitutional review of notice by publication, but
finding other issues dispositive, the court avoided the constitutional
issue.m
Justice Benham, writing for a court unanimous in its judgment, said
that a trial court has discretion to set aside judgments in circumstances
like these: a calendar call that did not always require the presence of
the parties and "extraordinary efforts made by appellee's counsel to
bring the case to trial in the absence of the unrepresented opposing
The legal issue here
party whom [he] knew to live out of this state. "
was a simple matter he concluded because trial judges retain enough
equitable power to do the right thing in these circumstances. me
Having dismissed the legal issue quickly, Justice Benham made it
clear that there was something more important he wanted to say. With
a long quote from his concurring opinion in Evanoff,m 5 he turned to his
professionalism theme. In Evanoff,he had told us that we should expect
more of lawyers than mere compliance with legal and ethical regulatory
requirements.'
For one thing, we should expect the civility among
them that our system depends upon, and we should expect them to
honor the need our citizens have for their day in court for another.2"
These, he said, with praise for the Chief Justice's Commission on
Professionalism, are "higher standards" that have been embodied in the
professionalism movement. 242 Referring to the appellee's attorney in
Evanoff,24 Justice Benham remembered that during oral argument
this attorney had been asked why he took a final decree without notice
to the adverse party. The lawyer replied that the law allowed the
procedure, and because it did, he had every right to use it.2' But the
law, Justice Benham complained, including the Code of Professional

235.

263 Ga. at 552, 437 S.E.2d at 458.

236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239.

262 Ga. 303, 418 S.E.2d 62 (1992) (Benham, J., concurring).

240. Id. at 305, 418 S.E.2d at 63.
241. Id. at 304, 418 S.E.2d at 63.
242. Id. Justice Benham is not alone in utilizing "professionalism standards" this way.
See Owens v. Neely, 866 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. App. 14th Dist. 1793). For other recent
references to professionalism standards, see, Fox v. LAM, 632 So. 2d 877 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1994) and Paramount v. QVC, 1994 WL 30181 (Del. Super.).
243. Id. at 305, 418 S.E.2d at 63.
244. Id.
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Responsibility, sets minimum standards. It does not guide us on what
our conduct as lawyers should be.' 5
Equating the conduct of the lawyer in Evanoff with the conduct of the
lawyer in Green, Justice Benham praised the case law that permitted
the court to do the right thing here; something it could not do in
Evanoff.'
He then warned the bar that lawyers who act "out of a
sense of blind and unbridled advocacy," and not "out of a spirit of
cooperation and civility" will not profit from their conduct if the court
can prevent it.217 In notice cases, this means that lawyers as "officers
of the court' 4 should
"make a good faith effort to ensure that all parties to a controversy
have a full and fair opportunity to be heard. Such an effort may entail,
as is already the customary practice of many attorneys, counsel
assuming the burden of notifying by mail any unrepresented opposing
party when their case appears on a trial calendar.n '
Notice that the regulatory function prevails so much here that the court
is writing as if it were issuing an FAO offering advice for future
conduct!'
The only peep we hear from the judicial function in the

245. Id. Of course the Justice Benhams of the world have a long way to go to convince
us that it is not whether you win or lose but how you play the game. While this may be
our better ethic, the opposing view is also part of our tradition. For a good example see
Deron Snyder, Practice of Corkingwith Rules: Code of Silence Accepted Among Hitters,
USA TODAY BASEBALL WEEKLY, July 27-Aug. 2, 1994, at 6 quoting Angels announcer Billy
Samples, who played for three teams from 1978 to 1986, on the subject of corked bats: "[I1f
you know how to do it and get away with it, it's part of the game. Like Gaylord Perry
throwing spitballs all those years. It's basic Americana. If allowed, you'll stretch the
boundaries of the game." Justice Benham reminds us that the boundaries of the game are
important and in doing so he faces squarely this "basic Americana" tradition that forever
competes with the one he seeks to honor.
246. 263 Ga. at 554, 437 S.E.2d at 459.
247.
248.

Id.
Id.

249. Id. at 554-55, 437 S.E.2d at 459-60.
250. Id. at 552-55, 437 S.E.2d at 458-60. In some ways, this opinion appears to be
another example of something we have already seen: In some circumstances lawyers have
special ethical obligations beyond the law that the appellate courts are apparently willing
to impose upon them as a matter of law within the regulatory function. What cases like
AFLAC or Tante are doing is insisting as a matter of law that lawyers live truthfully as
the trusted confidants of their clients. What Justice Benham is doing here, however, is not
the same. He is arguing for a particular conception of the lawyer's role in society-quite
a different matter indeed! For example, to oppose the regulation of lawyers we have seen
thus far, a principled judge would have to argue that lawyers are not special or not so
special or offer some variation on this theme. These are not, however, arguments that
most judges are comfortable making so what they do instead, as was done in Donahue or
in the real estate closing cases, is to avoid the conversation entirely by staying within the
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majority opinion is Justice Benham's brief nod to case support for
equitable discretion in circumstances like these.

But the judicial function will not give up the struggle so easily.
Rushing to its defense, Justice Sears-Collins disagreed with the
majority's interpretation of USCR 8.4 and with its reliance on professionalism standards to reverse the judgment." As for the first, she said
that a natural reading of the provision is that it requires the parties and
The options it provides are merely
counsel to be ready for trial.'

substitutes for an appearance, she added.'

Accordingly, Justice

Benham was wrong to find that appearance was not always required
It is
(thus making ,room for his finding of equitable discretion).

permissible, she implied, to do equity while preserving the law, but not
at the law's expense.'
This quibble was clearly not what was troubling her, however. She
agrees that notification of appellant by appellee's counsel would have
been the better practice she added, and she too, applauds the Chief
Justice's Commission on Professionalism, but neither of these should
Here are her
have much to do with the outcome of this case.'

judicial function. But a judge opposed to the kind of regulation Justice Benham proposes
in Green has no need to avoid the argument. Such a judge can agree with Benham that
lawyers are just as special as he claims, but disagree with his particular conception of the
lawyer's role in society. Justice Sears-Collins hinted at one opposing conception in her
concurring opinion in Green. Green v. Green, 263 Ga. at 555, 437 S.E.2d at 460 (SearsCollins, J., concurring).
251. 263 Ga. at 555, 437 S.E.2d at 460 (Sears-Collins, J., concurring).
252. Id at 555-56, 437 S.E.2d at 460.
253. Id. at 556, 437 S.E.2d at 460.
254. Id. There is another way of analyzing Justice Benham's opinion. His references
to professionalism can be seen as nothing more than taking into account the attorney's
conduct in determining whether equitable discretion is permissible here. It is true, of
course, as Justice Sears-Collins also points out, that doing this imposes sanctions against
the client for the attorney's misconduct. But there is nothing new in this! Clients are
almost always bound by their attorneys' mistakes. Furthermore, while consistent with the
law, the misconduct of the attorney here gave the client an unfair advantage in the case
that is inconsistent in principle with the client's own claim to zealous advocacy. Zealous
advocacy is justified by the morality that demands that each person be heard. Here, all
that would be imposed upon the client is a prohibition on denying this same right to the
opposing party. Resting upon the principle that justifies the lawyer's advocacy for the
client to begin with, as it does, this moral burden could be as fairly shared by clients as by
attorneys. This is true even though Benham says that the source of the obligation to give
notice is the lawyer's role as an officer of the court.
In any event, an appellate court should consider the attorney's misconduct in the exercise
of its equitable powers whether it does so by reference to professionalism standards or not.
Here Benham refers to a practice of making a good faith effort to notify the other side.- If
there is such a practice, it should be considered in any equitable inquiry.
255. Id., 437 S.E.2d at 461.
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reasons: First, there are judicial function due process concerns in using
nonmandatory professionalism standards this way.'s Unspoken, but
implied, is that it is disingenuous to speak of a day in court while
ignoring due process notice requirements. Second, using professionalism
standards in this regulatory function way is contrary to prior case law
including Davis v. Findley 7 and contrary to the guidance of the
profession as expressed in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
and other sources.258 Third, this is a slippery regulatory slope to head
down.' 9 Finally, the judicial function has its own resources to bring
to bear on the inequities here-namely, the consitutional insufficiency
of notice by publication in these circumstances. Because she found this

256. Id. at 556-57, 437 S.E.2d at 461. Note that all Georgia professionalism
"standards," if it is right to call them that, are aspirational and nonmandatory by their own
terms. STATE BAR OF GA.,A Lawyer's Creed in STATE BAR OF GA. DIRECTORY & HANDBOOK
107-H (1993); STATE BAR OF GA. Specific Aspirational Ideals in STATE BAR OF GA.
DIRECTORY & HANDBOOK 107-H (1993).
257. 263 Ga. at 557, 437 S.E.2d at 461 (Sears-Collins, J., concurring). (Justice SearsCollins added this citation to Davis subsequently in a revision. The opinion was not
republished to include it.) The support she musters for her position is concerned with the
use of ethical regulatory standards such as the Model Rules or the Code of Professional
Responsibility and not with professionalism standards. I suppose however, that the only
significant difference for this argument would be that professionalism standards are not
disciplinary matters and that, therefore, consideration of them by appellate courts is in
some ways more appropriate. Even though it is unimportant here, it is another example
ofjudges within the judicial function ignoring the hierarchy of the regulatory function. In
one place, Justice Sears-Collins treats professionalism standards as if they were
disciplinary standards.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 558, 437 S.E.2d at 462. Although this is a slippery slope argument, there
is something more to it than just an imagined risk. So many lawyers tell us that the
judiciary must act soon to correct our lack of professionalism, that Justice Benham seems
fully justified in his efforts, and yet appellate courts are severely limited in what can do.
We must wonder from judicial attempts to civilize discovery with sanctions and so forth,
and case filings with the many variations on Rule 11, ifjudges are in fact the right group
for controlling the excesses of the bar? Can the community that is essential to civility be
formed this way? Can judges effectively control behavior outside the court without
corrupting the adversarial system? Are the norms they must use corrupted by the only
way in which they can be used by judges? Hidden within Justice Sears-Collins' discomfort
may also be concern that the enforcement of these norms may disadvantage the
representation of some groups as Professor Mashburn claims in Amy R. Mashburn,
Professionalismas Class Ideology: Ciuility Codes and Bar Hierarchy,28 VAL. U. L. REV.
657 (1994).
Having said all that, I would like to add my personal opinion that Justice Benham goes
too far. I certainly agree with his assessment but not with his methods. Professor
Mashburn tells us that "[clivility codes are built upon a subsurface pessimism about the
possibility ofgoverning human behavior through institutional control." Id. at 688. I think
that is right and that such pessimism is a good thing.
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last argument to be dispositive, she joined in the judgment of reversal
despite her quarrel with Justice Benham.'
Justice Sears-Collins is right to be concerned. Justice Benham's
opinion dramatically shifts towards the regulatory function and, in doing
so, shifts the nature of the judicial conversation. Justice Sears-Collins
fears this shift because she knows that preserving this ongoing
conversation is what the law is about. Despite the legitimacy of her
concerns, she should also recognize that the appellate courts are stuck
deep in this struggle between competing functions, and whatever her
wish, it will not go away. Her concurring opinion fails by not coming to
terms with this reality.
Behind this dispute between these excellent justices there lies an
important difference. It is one thing for a lawyer and a client" to
give notice to the opposing party because due process requires it, as
Justice Sears-Collins would have them do. It is quite another to give
that notice because it is something good lawyers and good people do.
She agrees with Justice Benham, of course, that the second reason is
preferable, but having done so, she argues that our courts have to ignore
this difference as they use the law to hold us together in good community.2 But courts cannot ignore this difference. T do so would be to
ignore the responsibility the courts have for shaping lawyers who, in
turn, shape their clients to be the kind of people for whom good
community is possible.2 While many, like Justice Sears-Collins, may
find Justice Benham's methods disturbing, his methods should be
recognized as an honest attempt at exercising the court's unavoidable
regulatory responsibilities even when acting in the judicial function.
Nevertheless, for now and to me, it seems good that we have the balance
in this struggle that a Justice Benham and a Justice Sears-Collins
provide.

260. 263 Ga. at 558, 437 S.E.2d at 462 (Sears-Collins, J., concurring).

261. See supra note 253.
262. 263 Ga. at 558, 437 S.E.2d at 462 (Sears-Collins, J., concurring).
263. For the most part, the public comes to lawyers not knowing what our system of
law entails; they do not know how the game is played. We lawyers teach them its rules.
We tell them whether fairness to others is expected and, in the process, we shape who they
are. Most people respond to moral concerns even in extreme personal circumstances if
there is someone willing to tell them the truth. The truth to be told to the client in Green
was that we (the lawyer and the client) do not want to proceed without giving your wife
notice that the day in court has finally arrived-not because the due process clause or the
court requires this, but because this is the kind of people we would like to be if we were
thinking at our best. Will the client hear this truth? Perhaps not; so much depends on the
relationship with the lawyer, and because it does, we return again to the importance of
cases like AFLAC and others that profess to hold lawyers to higher standards than we may
sometimes like to be held.
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B. Fee Waivers in Plea Bargaining
We were cursed with another badpractice issue this year. In FAQ 93-3,
the court considered the tactic of a prosecutor conditioning a plea
agreement in a death penalty case on a waiver of defense counsel's
fee.2 ' This badpractice is as bad an example of a breakdown in the
legal community as Tante is of a breakdown in a client-lawyer relationship. Fortunately, because the request prompting the FAO was based
on a much earlier incident that to my knowledge has not been repeated,
this badpractice may be an isolated event.
Unsurprisingly, the supreme court found this tactic to be unprofessional conduct." 6 It creates a personal interest conflict of interest for the
defense attorney, the court began, one that cannot be waived, despite
language in the applicable Standard of Conduct 2' that seems to
permit waiver of personal interest conflicts in all circumstances. 267
Even in personal interest conflicts however, a blanket nonwaivable
prohibition is not without precedence, the court continued, offering as an
example Standard 34's prohibition on obtaining publication rights from
I
a client.'
In this first part of the FAO the court seems to be forcing this issue
into the category of personal interests conflicts so that it can rely upon
the appropriate Standards of Conduct. But the real problem presented
by this objectionable tactic is not the personal interest conflict it creates
for the defendant's attorney; the real problem is the intentional creation
of this conflict by the prosecutor. After struggling through this awkward
beginning, the court turned its attention to this real problem. 9
Apparently not finding any ethical regulations on point (other than the
vague admonition to avoid impropriety, an admonition not found in the
Standards of Conduct nor in any Directory Rule of the Georgia Code of

264.

Formal Op. 93-3 (1993).

265. Id.
266. GA. RULES OF CT. ANN., Bar Rule 4-102, Standard 30 (1994).
267. Formal Op. 93-3 (1993).
268. See Formal Op. 93-3 (1993); GA. RULES OF CT. ANN., Bar Rule 4-102, Standard 34
(1994). This was a poor choice because Standard 34 does not create a prohibition on
obtaining publication rights at all! It is a procedural rule that postpones any conversation
with a client about publication rights until after the representation. Completely ignored
by this rule is the reality that publication rights can still affect the lawyer's professional

judgment in the representation even though they cannot be talked about until after the
representation is over. All the rule really does is lessen the possibility that the lawyer will

use his or her representation in the case as an overt way of pressuring the client into
accepting a publication agreement.
269. Formal Op. 93-3 (1993).
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Professional Responsibility),2 7 the court resorted to public policy
reasons to denounce the tactic. In the final analysis, the court concluded, this tactic is simply inconsistent with the role of the prosecutor to
seek justice.2 71
And right they are. The appointed attorney's fee is absolutely
irrelevant to guilt or to the degree of punishment appropriate for the
crime. Were this requested waiver of fees for individual profit, rather
than ostensibly for the protection of the county coffers, this would be
extortion or bribery or at least, compounding a crime. There is, I
believe, very little difference between this death penalty deal-making
and a police officer asking for twenty dollars to tear up a parking ticket.
The primary difference is that the ticket here is the defendant's life, and
neither the defendant, nor the defendant's attorney, has any choice but
to accept the lawless offer.
As right as this FAO is, however, it still presents problems. 2
Relevant to our theme is a problem that plagues all FAO's. (Not
surprisingly, it is in the FAO context that we first saw the beginning
struggle between the competing functions of the court)."' FAO's are
supposed to be written as if in a vacuum, that is, as if ethical and ethical
regulatory matters could be clearly distinguished from legal ones." 4
But of course, they cannot, and Georgia's experience with FAQ's has only

270. The term is the heading of DR 9-101 (Avoiding Even the Appearance of
Impropriety), but is not found in any of the rules under this heading.
271. Formal Op. 93-3 (1993).
272. In the text I discuss the problem most related to our theme. A second problem
with FAO 93-3 is that FAO's are supposed to be advisory and based on hypothetical
situations. FAQ 93-3 was neither. It is generally well known that this FAO was prompted
by the conduct of District Attorney Joseph H. Briley of the Ocmulgee Judicial Circuit in the
death penalty case of Tony B. Amadeo. (Your author joined with numerous other law
professors in an amicus brief in the case protesting Briley's methods.) This FAO was read
by most lawyers practicing in this area as a thinly disguised dressing down of Joe Briley.
Now there are obvious problems with dealing with unethical conduct this way. Normally,
if an attorney is alleged to have acted unethically, the proper course is to refer the matter
to disciplinary processes, and as we have seen, to seek legal rememdies for the harm done.
Here the defendant's lawyers could have filed for their fees arguing that the waiver was
unenforceable. They were not likely to do this, however, because of the possibility of
jeopardizing the plea bargain-even if that possibility was viewed as remote. Furthermore,
given the inability of the FAQ Board to find a Standard of Conduct on point, it is not likely
that the Disciplinary Board would have acted at all, thus giving at least an implicit
sanction to the conduct. The best way to handle this was the way it was handled even
though the function of FAO's was distorted in the process.
273. See generally Jack L. Sammons, Legal Ethics, 41 MERCER L. REv. 237,240 (1989);
Roy M. Sobelson, Legal Ethics, 44 MERCER L. REV. 281, 287-89 (1992).
274. Sobelson, supra note 39, at 287-89.
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confirmed this all too obvious truth.27 For example, even conduct as
egregious as that complained of in FAO 93-3 has at least a plausible
claim to legality that may conflict with its unethical status. In fact, this
bargaining tactic is similar to others that, while roundly condemned in
state advisory opinions, have been approved by the United States
Supreme Court.27 It is my opinion that the tactic complained of here
is distinguishable from those approved, but the point is that the effect
of this FAO, and all others, always remains in doubt until this distinguishing is done. And, where is this to be done? Only in the ongoing
struggle in the appellate courts between the ethical regulatory function
and the judicial function. Until that is done, we simply will not know
the effectiveness of this (or any other) FAO.
V. CONCLUSION
This last topic, Formal Advisory Opinions, takes us back to where the
struggle between the competing judicial and regulatory functions first
arose. Georgia's legal community's history, along with that of every
other state's, is replete with battles between the bar and the courts over
ethical issues. In these battles, the bar often used advisory opinions as
its primary weaponY 7 But these battles could not continue in an
intramural context because what the bar does in the ethical regulation

275. Id.
276. This plea bargaining technique was borrowed from defense tactics in civil rights
cases. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986). Evans was a question of statutory
interpretation and is a civil case. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's primary rationale,
that offers requiring waviers of attorney fees encouraged settlement by providing defense
with a strong justification to settle (and that the conflict of interests on the other side were
unimportant because the lawyer had an ethical responsibility to act in the client's best
interests), is plausible in a criminal plea bargaining context as well. See also Town of
Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987) in which the Supreme Court approved release/dismissal plea bargaining, that is, an offer to dismiss a criminal charge conditioned
upon the criminal defendant's dismissal of a civil action. The dissent in Rumery said this
was like asking for a contribution to the policemen's retirement fund in exchange for
dropping a felony charge. 480 U.S. at 408 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But, in dicta, the
Supreme Court said this was a permissible exercise of prosecutorial discretion to preserve
scarce resources for other allocations. 480 U.S. at 396. (And once you start talking about
the economics of plea bargaining, it is going to be hard to stop. These arguments are also
plausible in our context.)
As mentioned in the text, prior to the Supreme Court's approval of these tactics, both
had been condemned as unethical by state advisory opinion beards. See, e.g., Ethics
Commission of Oregon State Bar Opinion 483, 801 ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on
Professional Conduct, 7111 (1984. As far as I know, no state disciplinary board has been
willing to enforce ethical regulations in the face of the Supreme Court's approval of the
tactic.
277. See generally Koniak, supra note 3, at 59.
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of the profession, even in the issuing of advisory opinions, is done as the
delegate of the courts, specifically, of the states' supreme courts. What
we have seen in this year's survey of recent cases is the Georgia's
appellate courts effectively reclaiming what had been delegated to the
bar. They have done this by rendering decisions that are addressed to
the bar as much as they are to the disputants. And, thus, what had
been an intramural battle between the bar and the courts is now truly
a competition between the judicial and the regulatory functions the
appellate courts must serve in this area.
In reclaiming regulation, and in the process giving new importance to
the hierarchy of governing norms of ethical regulations, the appellate
courts are no doubt responding to repeated cries from many quarters
that reform of the legal profession is desperately needed. It is certainly
understandable that the courts would respond to these cries as its has,
but in doing so, they have started us on a process that is all too familiar
to our profession. Our initial efforts to regulate ourself as a profession
in this country were rhetorical calls to community, reminders of who we
are and of what it meant to be a good lawyer. These rhetorical appeals
eventually gave way to educational ethical codes which soon became
disciplinary ethical regulations. With each step in this increasing
legalization came concomitant decreases in aspirations and increases in
coerciveness.
The courts are willing to return us to this process of legalization of our
aspirations because we, as a profession, despair of our ability to reform
ourselves through the renewal of our community and of the good ethics
of our craft that is so obviously needed. As a profession (and as a
people) we simply do not have the patience nor the faith required for the
The courts' response to our
kind of reform that is truly needed.
situation then, however necessary it might be, is out of a moral of
despair. Only those who believe that by force of law we can make people
better and those who believe that there are no other alternatives should
find much solace in it.
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Assertion of attorney's retaining lies.
Practice of criminal law by part-time
judges.
Representation of criminal defendants
by county attorneys.
Ethical propriety of lawyer serving
simultaneously as state legislator and
part-time solicitor.
"Request for reconsideration as
Advisory Opinion No. 40."
Ethical propriety of a former superior
court judge representing a client that
had appeared before judge in a related
case.
Ethical propriety of the plaintiffs
attorney in a personal injury case
writing a letter to the insured
defendant which may contain legal
advice.
Closing real estate transactions on
sight drafts.
Closing of real estate transactions by
non-lawyers.
Fee arrangements on domestic cases.
Contingent fees in no-fault cases.
Advance fee payments
Drafter of will serving as executor.
Ethical propriety of conduct of a
district attorney in communicating
with prosecution and defense
witnesses.
Ethical duty of a lawyer to inquire as
to the source of fees.
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public defender.
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unrepresented opposing party.
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Ethical propriety of a lawyer interviewing the officers and employees of
an organization when that organization is the opposing party in litigation
without the consent of the organization.
see also 87-Ri.
Ethical propriety of an attorney
sending the written notice required in
O.C.G.A. § 51.12-14.
Request declined.
Conflict of Interest problems in child
support recovery actions.
Ethical propriety of attorney communi- Request declined.
cating with expert witnesses for opposing parties without knowledge or consent of the opposing counsel.
Ethical obligation of criminal defense
lawyers to provide indigent clients
with copies of transcripts needed to
pursue collateral post-conviction remedies.
Ethical propriety of an attorney repre- Request declined.
senting a defendant in a domestic
relations action when that attorney
has previously consulted with plaintiff
in that action.
Ethical propriety of a criminal defense Request declined.
lawyer acting as a special prosecutor
in isolated cases.
Guidelines for attorney utilizing
disbarred attorney as paralegal.
Attorney/Councilor of city representing
private clients before city recorder's
court.
Unauthorized practice of law, an attorney's obligation to disclose illegal acts
of his clients and whether communications between unlicensed attorney and
his client would be obtainable through
discovery.
Incorporation services by a CPA.

Request declined.

Ethical duty to report judicial
misconduct.
Ethical propriety of corporation collecting attorney's fees for legal work of
corporation's in-house attorneys.
Ethical issues concerning use of
temporary lawyers.

Request declined.

Request declined.

Request declined.

Withdrawn
Being redrafted
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89-R2.
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Whether the collection of debts owed
by the US government on behalf of the
creditors constituties the practice of
law.
Ethical propriety of partnership
between part-time magistrate and
part-time solicitor.
Use of in-house counsel by collection
agency.
Part-time county attorneys.

88-R5
88-R6
88-R7
88-R8

90-2

88-R9
88-RlO
88-Rll

88-R12

88-R13

90-1

89-Ri

92-1

89-R2

Ethical propriety of part-time law clerk
appearing before a present employer
judge.
Duty of Lawyer to preserve the funds
of a missing client
Use of in-house counsel to conduct real
estate closing.
Ethical considerations applicable to the
practice of law by an attorney not
licensed to practice law in Georgia in
the law department of a Georgia corporation.
Ethical propriety of a lawyer establishing a corporation as a separate entity
from his law practice to present seminars to prospective clients.
Ethical propriety of an attorney employed in-house by corporation entering into an agreement by which his
employer holds the attorney harmless
for personal malpractice committed in
the course of his employment.
(1) Ethical propriety of a law firm
obtaining a loan to cover advances to
clients for litigation expenses; and (2)
ethical considerations applicable to
payment of interest charged on loan
obtained by law firm to cover advances
to clients for litigation expenses.
Ethical propriety of placement agencies
for temporary lawyers.
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Request declined.

Request declined.
Request declined.
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comments.

Request declined.
Declined by S.Ct.
Request declined.

Request declined.

Combined with
88-R3.
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93-1

89-R4
89-115

89-R6
89-R7

89-R8

89-R9
89-RlO
89-Rll

89-R12

89-R13

91-3

Whether the designation "special counsel" may be used to describe an attorney and/or law firm affiliated with
another law firm for the specific purpose of providing consultation and advice to the other firm in specialized
legal areas; and (2) whether the ethical
rules governing conflict of interest apply as if the firm, the affiliated attorney and the affiliated firm constitute a
single firm.
Ethical considerations applicable to the
fee agreement between a collection
agency and an attorney.
Ethical considerations applicable to a
lawyer's offer of specialized assistance
or consultation services to other
lawyers.
Lawyer as a witness.
Ethical propriety of a lawyer serving
simultaneously as county attorney and
part-time state court judge for the
same county.
Ethical propriety of a lawyer paying
his non-lawyer employees a monthly
bonus from the gross receipts of his
law office.
Ethical propriety of an attorney
sharing court awarded attorney's fees
with the attorney's client.
Ethical considerations applicable to
lawyer paying client's expenses out of
settlement over client's objections.
Confidentiality issues.
Ethical propriety of lawyer representing two separate legal entities with
conflicting interest without obtaining
the informed consent of both entities.
Ethical propriety of disclosing client's
names to the Internal Revenue
Service.
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Request declined.
Request declined.

Request declined.
Referred to Jud.
Qualifications
Commission.

Request declined.
See FAO 88-2.
Awaiting order
at the S.Ct.
Request delcined.
Deferred until
pending litigation involving issues is resolved.
Request declined.

Awaiting order
90-Ri
90-R2

Ethical propriety of lawyer referral
service collecting percentage of fees
paid to participating attorneys.
"Modification of Advisory Opinion No.
40."

Awaiting order

at the S.Ct.
Request declined.
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90-R3

92-2

90-R4
90-R5

90-R6

93-2

90-R7
90-R8
90-R9

91-RI

91-R2

91-R3

91-R4

91-R5

93-3

Ethical propriety of a lawyer advertising for legal business with the intention of referring a majority of that
business out to other lawyers without
disclosing that intent in the advertisement.
Ethical issues relating to a lawyer's
participation in a for-profit prepaid
legal services plan.
Whether conduct by an attorney in
violation of DR7-102 is subject to discipline under provisions of Standard
45(c).
Ethical considerations of an attorney
representing an insurance company on
a subrogation claim and simultaneously representing the insured.
Disclosure of clients confidences and
secrets.
Ethical propriety of public defender
handling more cases than he/she can
confidently handle.
Ethical propriety of city or county
attorney representing criminal defendant in proceedings to contest civil condemnations when the proceeds are forfeited to the city or county.
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Request declined.
Request declined.

Request declined.
Request declined.
Request declined

Ethical propriety of a county attorney
also serving as indigent defense counsel for all indigent criminal defendants
in county.
Ethical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal
case on the waiver of defense counsel's
fee.

Request declined.

May a lawyer properly contact and
interview former employees of an organization represented by counsel to
obtain information relevant to litigation against the organization?
Ethical propriety of a lawyer promoting his or her services by direct mail
through coupon mailouts that are obviously advertisements.
Ethical propriety of an attorney recording or causing to be recorded a conversation to which the attorney or the
attorney's agent is a party without the
knowledge and consent of the party to
the conversation.

Awaiting order

at S.Ct.

Request declined.

Request declined.
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91-R6

Ethical propriety of prosecutors participating in contract between Georgia
Department of Human Resources and
prosecuting attorney's council for collection in criminal prosecution of cases
involving suspected welfare fraud.
Ethical propriety of a lawyer posting
bail for his clients.
Propriety of an attorney permitting the
use of his letterhead stationary by a
retainer client who is writing as a
creditor or as a collection agency seeking to collect an account or debt from
the recipient.
A lawyer communicating to other
lawyers his or her availability to act as
a consultant in particular areas of law.
Use by lawyers of bank credit cards in
effecting collection of fees.

91-R7
91-R8

91-R9
91-RlO

91-Rll

91-R12
91-R13
91-R14

92-Rl
92-R2

93-Rl

93-R2

Ethical considerations applicable to
communications between a former
partner or associate of a law firm with
clients of the firm.
Status of non-admitted lawyers.
Ethical propriety of real estate closing
attorney's disclosure of identity of
lender client.
Duty of appointed counsel to seek bond
for indigent defendant.
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Request declined.

Request declined.
Adivsory No. 5.
See State Bar
Handbook

Advisory No. 11.
See State Bar
Handbook.
Advisory Nos. 13
and 24. See
State Bar
Handbook.
Being re-written.
Advisory No. 32.
See State Bar
Handbook.
Request declined.
Request declined.
Request declined.

Ethical considerations applicable to
lawyers in a space sharing
arrangement.
Is an Assistant General Counsel of the
State Bar liable under O.C.GA. § 51-781 or any portion of O.C.G.A. § 51-7-80
for abusive litigation.

Request declined.

Ethical propriety of an attorney representing a municipality and its police
department while simultaneously representing a law enforcement officer
employed by the municipality under
certain circumstances.
Ethical propriety of lawyer participating in lawcard fee collection program.

Request declined.

Request declined.
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comments.
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93-R3A
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Ethical propriety of a court appointed
attorney changing his/her status from
appointed to retained counsel upon
notification that indigent client is
capable and willing to pay appointed
counsel.
Whether a court-appointed attorney
should notify the appointing authority
if he/she determines that the client is
presently and/or was never indigent.
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Published for
comments.

Pending with the
Board.

